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Karpman: Locking the Golden Door

LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR AND THROWING AWAY THE
KEY: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYLUM DURING THE YEARS OF THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Samantha B. Karpman*
“Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send these,
the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!"1
ABSTRACT
The years of the Trump Administration have certainly been
some of the most divisive in modern American political history. One
of the largest divides arose from former President Trump’s brazen,
“zero tolerance” immigration policies that relentlessly attacked many
forms of immigration coming into the United States. Asylum-based
immigration, which allows immigrants to come to this country as a
safe haven when they are fleeing persecution in their home countries,
was one of former President Trump’s main targets. Former President
*

J.D. Candidate 2022, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.A.
Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. I would like to thank my friends
and family for all the love and encouragement they have given me over the years
and for always inspiring me to follow my passion. I would also like to thank
Professor Seplowitz and the members of the Law Review who have been
instrumental in the construction of my Note through their continued support and
guidance during the entire process including: Editors-in-Chief, Kaleigh Gorman
and Ariel Berkowitz; Managing Editors, Bryan Schenkman and Margaret
Goodman; my Notes Editors, Alessandra Albano and Mike Petridis; and my
Research Editor, Siara Ossa. Finally, I would like to thank my three remarkable
faculty advisors: Professor Jeffrey B. Morris (for helping to shape my Note in its
early stages), Professor Rajat Shankar (for his immense knowledge of immigration
law), and Professor Jorge Roig (for his incredible expertise in constitutional law).
1
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/colossus.htm.
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Trump even came dangerously close to eliminating asylum-based
immigration with his “Death to Asylum” policy in December of
2020. President Biden has since reversed many of former President
Trump’s detrimental asylum policies and enacted executive orders
that facilitate asylum-based immigration. While asylum-based
immigration has been saved by President Biden (for now), the actions
of the Trump Administration have highlighted the issues regarding
lack of consistency and over-delegation to the executive branch that
plague immigration law to this day. This Note will examine various
sources of asylum law, both prior to and during the Trump
Administration, and evaluate the constitutionality of asylum policies
between 2016 and 2020.
Finally, this Note will give four
recommendations future administrations can implement in order to
provide fairer and more consistent asylum policies that are not so
dependent on which President happens to be in power at the time: (1)
creating a direct, fair, and inclusive path to citizenship; (2) decreasing
ICE’s role in exchange for increasing the EOIR’s presence; (3)
changing the focus in creating available facilities to immigrants; and
(4) guaranteeing legal representation in immigration proceedings.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Emma Lazarus’ powerful words, inscribed on the Statue of
Liberty, serve as both a reminder of our nation’s rich immigrant
history and an inspiring message to those who come to this country to
build a better life for themselves and their families as part of the
“American dream.”
Ever since the colonial era, the United States – referred to
then as part of the “New World” – has always been thought of as a
destination of hope and opportunity. During the colonial period, a
large influx of people came, mainly from European nations, to
colonize and settle areas that would eventually form the United
States.2 The United States facilitated free-flowing immigration
without any restrictions for roughly a century after it became an
independent nation.3 During the American Industrial Revolution, 4
2

U.S.
Immigration
Before
1965,
HISTORY
(July
28,
2020),
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/u-s-immigration-before1965#section_1.
3
Historical Overview of Immigration Policy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD.,
https://cis.org/Historical-Overview-Immigration-Policy (last visited June 16, 2021);

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/12

2

Karpman: Locking the Golden Door

2021

LOCKING THE GOLDEN DOOR

1473

especially from 1880 to 1920, the federal government issued
regulations to monitor the “first wave of immigration.”5 Prior to this
era, immigration was primarily governed by the individual states. 6
However, the federal government became more involved in
regulating immigration through the introduction of federal
legislation.7 Restrictions imposed by the new federal legislation not
only complicated the process of coming to the country, they also
made the necessary qualifications to successfully immigrate with full
documentation increasingly difficult to satisfy.8 The complications
created by immigration legislation are especially difficult for
immigrants who may not feasibly be able to wait for years in order
for their paperwork to process.9 Among this group of immigrants are
asylum seekers, individuals who want to escape their home countries
due to a fear of persecution or other life-or-death situations.10
This Note will discuss the Trump Administration’s attempt to
effectively nullify asylum-based immigration11 and how former
President Trump used both the broad delegation of authority to the
executive branch in the field of immigration law and the pandemic to
justify his actions.12 At the same time, this Note will analyze what
President Biden has done during his term so far13 – under the same
Philip Martin, Trends in Migration to the U.S., POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU
(May 19, 2014), https://www.prb.org/us-migration-trends.
4
The American Industrial Revolution occurred in the late nineteenth to early
twentieth centuries. The Industrial Revolution in the United States, LIBR. OF
CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/industrial-revolution-in-theunited-states (last visited Feb. 7, 2021).
5
U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 2.
6
Id.
7
See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding that the powers to set
rules regarding immigration and manage foreign relations rested with the federal
government, not the individual states). Since this case, there has been a plethora of
federal immigration regulations that created “waves” of immigration. See A Brief
History of Civil Rights in the United States, GEO. L. LIBR. (Jan. 27, 2021, 11:42
AM), https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=592919&p=4171684.
8
Michelle Mark, Jeff Sessions Said Immigrants Should ‘Wait Their Turn’ to Come
to the US – Here’s How Complicated That Process Can Be, BUS. INSIDER (May 3,
2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-green-card-visa-legalimmigration-us-news-trump-2017-4.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See infra Section V.
12
See infra Sections VI-VII.
13
As of the date of publication of this Note, which is in October 2021.
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authority as former President Trump – to preserve and facilitate
asylum-based immigration.14 Along with discussing the differences
in asylum policies between the two administrations, this Note will
provide several general solutions that can be implemented to help
create lasting and consistent immigration reform that does not
fluctuate from administration to administration.15 There are two
limitations on the overall scope of this Note. First, this Note will
mainly limit its analysis to the highest level of actors of each of the
three branches of the federal government. Second, while there are
several ways an individual can immigrate to the United States under
current immigration law, this Note will focus solely on asylum.
This Note will be divided into nine sections. Section II will
discuss the development of federal immigration law in the United
States. Section III will give a general overview of asylum and the
asylum process. Section IV will discuss and offer the history of the
different sources of American asylum law, including federal statutes,
major Supreme Court decisions, executive orders, treaties, and
international norms. Section V will examine asylum policies during
the Trump Administration.
Section VI will evaluate the
constitutionality of the polices discussed in Section V. Section VII
will discuss the COVID-19 pandemic and the pandemic’s impact on
United States immigration policies, especially regarding asylum
seekers. Section VIII will address various solutions, and discuss
what the Biden Administration has already done, to overcome
contemporary asylum hurdles through immigration reform. Finally,
Section IX will conclude the Note.
II.

IMMIGRATION WAVES & HOW THEY SHAPED U.S. FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION LAW

The first wave of immigration began around the Civil War,
when some states passed legislation allowing immigrant laborers and
soldiers to enter the country. 16 Following the ruling in Chy Lung v.
Freeman,17 and the enormous increase in immigration throughout the
14

See infra Section VIII.
See infra Sections VIII-IX.
16
Éva Eszter Szabó, The Migration Factor in the American Civil War: The Impact
of Voluntary Population Movements on the War Effort, AMERICANA (Spring 2016),
http://americanaejournal.hu/vol12no1/szabo.
17
92 U.S. 275 (1876).
15
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latter half of the nineteenth century, 18 Congress passed the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Alien Contract Labor Laws of 1885
and 1887 to restrict labor-based immigration.19 The Immigration Act
of 1882 imposed a fifty-cent tax for each immigrant and excluded
certain groups of people from the country including “idiots, lunatics,
convicts, and persons likely to become a public charge.”20 The
Immigration Act of 1891 further excluded certain immigrant groups
including “polygamists, persons convicted of crimes of moral
turpitude, and those suffering loathsome or contagious diseases.” 21
Finally, among this wave’s most notable regulations are the creation
of immigration checkpoints 22 and a standardized immigration and
naturalization policy.23
The second wave of immigration began with a large group of
immigrants coming into the United States around the time of World
War I and a few years following the end of the war. 24 From 1900 to
1920, the U.S. admitted over 14.5 million immigrants.25 In response
to growing fears about mass immigration and its impact on the
country, Congress passed a series of immigration regulations in the
Immigration Act of 1917 to slow down the rate of immigration. 26
The Immigration Act of 1917 required that certain factors must be
satisfied so a person could be eligible to immigrate. 27 These factors
included the immigrant’s literacy in their native language, more
rigorous medical examinations, and imposing additional paper
18

Szabó, supra note 16; see also Early American Immigration Policies, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 30, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/early-american-immigration-policies.
19
Early American Immigration Policies, supra note 18.
20
Id.
21
Origins of the Federal Immigration Service, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
(July 30, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-inshistory/origins-of-the-federal-immigration-service.
22
Id. The most famous of these checkpoints was Ellis Island in New York. Id.
Other entry locations included cities with busy travel ports including Boston and
Philadelphia. Id.
23
Id.; Origins of the Federal Naturalization Service, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-ofins-history/origins-of-the-federal-naturalization-service.
24
Mass Immigration and WWI, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 30,
2020), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/mass-immigration-and-wwi.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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requirements such as passports and border crossing cards. 28 At the
end of the post-World War I wave, the federal government
implemented the national origin quota system. 29 Under the quota
system, each nationality received a maximum quota of valid visas it
could issue based on its representation in past census figures. 30
Along with the severe restrictions imposed by the quota system and
the 1917 Immigration Act, Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol
within the Immigration Service to enforce these new regulations.31
The third wave of immigration started during World War II.32
The federal government took measures to tighten control at the
domestic border in response to the national security threat looming on
the horizon.33 The increased security measures included heightened
recording procedures, organized internment camps and detention
facilities for enemy aliens, and increased Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) personnel. 34 At the same time, the
federal government and INS personnel eliminated barriers for
noncitizens to serve in the military and created more efficient
overseas naturalization processes.35
The fourth wave is characterized by the implementation of
post-World War II relief. 36 Among the most notable pieces of
legislation from this period is the Immigration and Nationality Act. 37
This Act, which Congress enacted in 1952, reformed and re-codified
28

Id.
Era of Restriction, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/era-ofrestriction.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
World War II, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/world-war-ii.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Military Naturalization During WWII, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec.
6, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/overview-ofins-history/military-naturalization-during-wwii.
36
Post-War Years, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/post-waryears.
37
Id. The INA is also referred to as the Hart-Celler Act due to the names of the
main sponsors of the bill, Philip Hart and Emanuel Celler. Jerry Kammer, The
Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://cis.org/Report/HartCeller-Immigration-Act-1965.
29
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the entire United States immigration system. 38 The Immigration and
Nationality Act received significant amendments in 1965, which is
the current version of the Act. 39 One of the key revisions to the
immigration law during this period was the stark reduction of the
quota system, which de-racialized immigration and created a shift
from European-heavy immigration to Asian and Latin Americanheavy immigration.40
The fifth wave started around 1980 and lasted until the
1990s.41 During this time, changes in world migration patterns made
modern international travel much easier and created a growing
emphasis on controlling illegal immigration. 42 The immigration
regulations defining this period included the Refugee Act of 1980,
the Immigration Act of 1990 (“IMMACT 90”), and the Illegal
Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”).43
Finally, the most recent wave of immigration and immigration
reform took place in the post-9/11 era.44 After the events of the
September 11 terrorist attack, the federal government became hypervigilant about border security and removing criminal aliens for the
protection of the country. 45 This wave of immigration marked the
creation of three immigration agencies under the newly-created
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”): Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).46

38

Post-War Years, supra note 36.
Id.
40
Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population
Growth and Change Through 2065, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wavebrings-59-million-to-u-s-driving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065.
41
Late Twentieth Century, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/late-twentiethcentury.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Post-9/11, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/post-911.
45
Id.
46
Id.
39
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GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Asylum-based immigration serves as a refuge for individuals
who face a credible fear of persecution, if they are forced to return to
their home country.47 Asylum immigration began in the United
States as early as 1948 when President Truman allowed a great
number of Europeans, including Jewish and Eastern-European
refugees, to enter the United States following World War II. 48
Similar to other forms of immigration, asylum was largely formalized
and established in the post-World War II wave of immigration
through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.49
Under current immigration laws, asylum can be either
affirmative or defensive. 50 For both affirmative and defensive
asylum, applicants file an Application for Asylum and Withholding
of Removal (“I-589 Application”).51 Applicants seeking affirmative
asylum file this application with the USCIS before they are detained
or threatened with removal. 52 For defensive asylum claims, an
applicant has already been detained before he or she has had a chance
to file the asylum application with the USCIS.53 Therefore, for
47

Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum. Asylum laws
have constantly been reworked and redefined to include or exclude certain groups
of people. Id. The current groups allowed to state a claim for asylum under the
current system are those that have suffered persecution or have a reasonable fear
persecution due to the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. Id.
48
Morning Edition, The History of Asylum Laws, NPR (June 29, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624566268/the-history-of-asylum-laws.
49
U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 2.
50
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
(Sept.
22,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-andasylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-in-the-united-states. The key difference between
affirmative and defensive asylum is the timing of when the immigrant submits the
asylum application. Id. The legal requirements for affirmative and defensive
asylum are the same. Id.
51
I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.
(Aug.
25,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-589.pdf.
52
The Affirmative Asylum Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept. 22,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/theaffirmative-asylum-process.
53
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50.
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defensive asylum claims, the paperwork for the I-589 Application
must be filed with the immigration court that either hears the
applicant’s removal proceedings or encompasses the jurisdiction of
the applicant’s detention location. 54
Additionally, there are bars to asylum that neither affirmative
nor defensive asylum petitions can overcome, except for instances of
“changed circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances.” 55 Bars to
asylum can occur when: (1) a previous asylum application made by
the applicant was denied by an immigration judge or the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the Board”) or (2) the applicant can
be safely removed to a third country under a two-party or multi-party
agreement between the United States and potential host country. 56
Applicants can also include spouses and any of their children, if the
child is unmarried and under the age of twenty-one, in their I-589
applications, so long as the included person also currently resides in
the United States.57
Next, once the USCIS receives the completed application, the
applicant goes through fingerprinting and background checks.58
Following the background checks, the next step is the interview
process.59 Everyone who is included in the application must be
present for the interview, including any children or spouses the
applicant chose to include. 60 The applicant may also attend the
54

Id.
Establishing Good Cause or Exceptional Circumstances, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugeesand-asylum/asylum/establishing-good-cause-or-exceptional-circumstances.
56
Id. These examples are not the only scenarios where a bar can thwart an asylum
petition, but they are among the most common bars to asylum listed on the USCIS
website. Id.
57
Asylum, supra note 47.
58
The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 52.
59
Id. To schedule the interview, the applicant will receive a notice to make an
appointment with an asylum officer at one of the eight asylum offices, two asylum
sub-offices, or at a USCIS field office. Id. Applicants who were originally
scheduled for an interview that had to be rescheduled at the applicant’s request or
to meet the needs of USCIS receive first priority for obtaining interview dates. Id.
Second priority goes to applications that have been pending for twenty-one days or
less since filing. Id. Third priority goes to all other asylum interviews. Id.
Asylum interviews usually last an hour and the asylum officer asks questions about
specific material that applicants included in their I-589 application. Id.
60
Preparing for Your Asylum Interview, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Sept.
22,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-andasylum/asylum/preparing-for-your-asylum-interview.
55
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interview with an attorney 61 and an interpreter, if needed.62 After the
interview, the asylum office issues a decision. 63 If the asylum office
grants asylum, the case is concluded and the applicant is an asylee. 64
However, if the asylum office does not grant the application for
asylum, the case is referred to the immigration court for de novo
review.65
Once in immigration court, the asylum petition, even if it
started out as affirmative, is now defensive because the applicant is
now subject to removal proceedings. 66 At this time, the DHS issues a
notice to appear in immigration court. 67 This notice serves as the
charging instrument to initiate the action in immigration court. 68
Following the DHS’s actions, or similar actions by any other relevant
enforcement agency, such as ICE, there is a master calendar
hearing.69 A master calendar hearing is usually the first time the
immigrant is before an immigration judge from the Executive Office
for Immigrant Review (“EOIR”). 70 One purpose of a master calendar
hearing is administrative – allowing the immigration court to obtain
background information about the applicant’s immigration status and
to schedule the applicant’s merits hearing. 71 In addition to its
Id.; see also KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF (2016). Unlike defendants’
fundamental right to an attorney in criminal law where, even if they cannot afford
an attorney, one will always be provided for them, there is no right to an attorney in
immigration law. Id. If immigrants would like to have an attorney help them
through the paper application process, asylum interview, and/or any court
proceedings, they must be able to find and pay for the attorney themselves. Id.
62
Preparing for Your Asylum Interview, supra note 60.
63
Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, IMMIGR. JUST.,
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Asylum%20Flow%20
Chart.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50.
67
Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63.
68
8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 (2020).
69
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50.
70
When You’ll Get the Immigration Court Judge’s Decision, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/judges-decision-immigration-court-howlong-it-will-take-get.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
71
See Immigration Judge Master Calendar Checklist for Pro Se Respondents, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/924091/download (last
visited Sept. 29, 2020) (discussing the types of questions asked at a master calendar
hearing).
61
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administrative purpose, a master calendar hearing allows judges to
make other procedural decisions in a removal case. 72 Therefore, the
judge can issue multiple master calendar hearings if the judge
believes more information is needed before the applicant’s individual
merits hearing.73
The merits hearing occurs at the conclusion of the master
calendar hearing(s). 74 This hearing serves as the trial portion of the
removal proceedings, where both the government and the applicant
present their substantive cases to the immigration judge as to whether
the applicant should be allowed to stay in the United States.75 At the
conclusion of the merits hearing, the immigration judge makes a
decision, either orally at the hearing or in writing one to six months
later, on whether to grant asylum.76 If the judge decides to grant
asylum and DHS does not appeal, the applicant is now an asylee and
his or her case in immigration court is now over. 77
However, if the immigration judge denies or grants asylum
but DHS appeals, the appeal is then heard before the Board.78 The
BIA then makes its decision on whether to grant the appeal. 79 If the
BIA grants asylum, the applicant becomes an asylee or, if asylum
was originally denied, the case is remanded to immigration court. 80
If the BIA denies asylum, applicants may file a petition for
review at the federal circuit court encompassing the trial court where

72

Id.

73

Master
Calendar
Hearing,
IMMIGR.
JUST.
CAMPAIGN,
https://immigrationjustice.us/get-trained/lpr-cancellation/master-calendar-hearing
(last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
74
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 50; Conversation with Rajat
Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Sep. 25, 2020 at 1:30 PM EST. If
immigration judges choose to have multiple calendar hearings, they will often have
no more than three total calendar hearings. Id. By that time, judges often believe
they have gathered enough information for the individual merits hearing. Id.
75
Fong & Aquino, Merits Hearing Versus the Master Calendar Docket, FONG &
AQUINO (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.immigrationvisaattorneyblog.com/meritshearing-versus-master-calendar-docket.
76
Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63.
77
Id. Once the applicant’s case is concluded, the threat of removal ends as well.
Id.
78
Id. The appeal must be filed with the BIA within thirty days of the immigration
judge’s decision. Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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the immigration hearing was originally held. 81 If the circuit court
grants the petition, the case is remanded to the BIA. 82 However, if
the petition is denied, the applicant is ordered to be removed from the
United States.83
The process involved in asylum claims is very lengthy; for
example, the average case in 2019 took the EOIR 816 days to
complete.84 Due to the significant amount of time involved in
litigating asylum cases, there is an enormous backlog in the
immigration system.85 Forty-eight percent of the immigration court
backlog, more than 476,000 asylum cases, were pending in the
immigration court system.86 Along with the increased burden on the
immigration system, there has been a spike of expedited removal
proceedings referred by Border Patrol to USCIS over the past ten
years.87
IV.

DIFFERENT SOURCES OF ASYLUM LAW

Each branch of the federal government plays a distinct role in
establishing modern asylum law. The separation of powers among
the branches must be kept in mind when dealing with asylum cases. 88
This is because one of the current issues facing asylum law is that the
federal government has thrown off a delicate balance and granted an
extreme amount of power to the executive branch at the expense of:
(1) the inherent powers of the other two branches and (2) even more

81

Appeals of BIA Decisions, STONE GRZEGOREK & GONZALEZ LLP,
https://www.sggimmigration.com/practice-groups/familyremoval/litigation/appeals-of-bia-decisions (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). The
applicant’s petition for review is generally filed in the federal circuit court where
the immigration hearing was originally held. Id.
82
Flow Chart: Steps in the Asylum Process, supra note 63.
83
Id.
84
Andrew R. Arthur, Statistics Reveal the Scope of the Asylum Backlog, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://cis.org/Arthur/Statistics-Reveal-ScopeAsylum-Backlog.
85
Id.
86
Id. Out of asylum cases in the immigration court backlog, roughly 71.2% of
those cases – 340,810 – are affirmative asylum applications. Id.
87
Id. This percentage increased from five percent to more than forty percent. Id.
88
Freddie Wilkinson, The Federal Role in Immigration, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan.
27,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/federal-roleimmigration/12th-grade.
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importantly, the rights of asylum applicants.89 While this Note will
mainly focus on domestic law, this section will also briefly discuss
international conventions, because many of our domestic asylum
laws come from norms and customs that arise under principles of
international law.90 Finally, due to this Note’s focus on asylum law,
these sections will only address sources of immigration law that have
had either a direct or indirect impact on asylum-based immigration.91
A.

Congress
1.

General Constitutional Power

Out of the three branches of the federal government,
Congress, has the broadest power to regulate immigration law under
the Constitution.92 The Constitution grants Congress a plenary power
in regulating immigration law. 93 Not only does Congress have the
89

See id.
Study Guide: The Rights of Refugees, UNIV. OF MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR. (2003),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/studyguides/refugees.htm.
91
This means that several major sources of immigration law will not be discussed
due to their inapplicability to asylum. For example, Section IV(A) will not discuss
pieces of legislation such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which focused
squarely on race-based bars to immigration (not on persecution or fear of the
immigrant), and 1990 Immigration Act, which specifically leaves out special
classes of immigrants such as refugees and asylees. See Chinese Exclusion Act,
Pub. L. No. 47-126 (1882); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990).
While other crucial Supreme Court cases helped develop immigration law in
general such as Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (addressing the
Constitutional issues associated with indefinite periods of post-removal-period
detention) and Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005)
(ruling on the administrative procedures of deportation), they will not be discussed
in Section IV(B) because they do not deal with asylum law. Finally, Section IV(C)
will not address crucial non-asylum policies such as President Reagan’s and Bush
Sr.’s “Family Fairness” policy, Executive Order 12081, which terminated the
expedited naturalization process for military personnel, and Executive Order
12324, which deals with the confrontation of illegal aliens at the border. See
Immigration Council Strongly Reaffirms Research on Reagan-Bush Family
Fairness Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 5, 2014); Exec. Order. No. 12081, 43
Fed. Reg. 42,237 (Sept. 18, 1978); Exec. Order. No. 12324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109
(Sept. 18, 1978).
92
Freddie Wilkinson, The Federal Role in Immigration, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan.
27,
2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/federal-roleimmigration/12th-grade.
93
Id.
90
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enumerated naturalization power under Article One, Section Eight,
Clause Four of the Constitution, but also a large majority of
immigration law and immigration-based procedure is based on
statutes passed by Congress.94 However, Congress has also delegated
a substantial amount of its authority to govern immigration law to the
executive branch, which was ratified by various Supreme Court
decisions.95
2.

Key Asylum Statutes Prior to the Trump
Administration

While initial forms of asylum law were created in response to
the aftermath of World War II, 96 the first federal statute that codified
asylum and set firm guidelines for the asylum process is the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA”).97 Prior to the
implementation of the INA, there was a national quota system that
preferred European immigrants.98 By eliminating the quota system,
the INA gave rise to large-scale immigration that characterizes the
modern wave of immigration. 99 Another effect of eliminating the
formal quota system, is the shift in immigration law to give
preference to applicants who have family members currently in the
United States rather than those lacking any ties to this country.100
Along with the general foundational basis the INA provides, it
deals specifically with asylum law in 8 U.S.C. § 1158.101 This part of
the INA explains: (1) who has standing to apply for asylum and

94

Id.
See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.
Ct. 830 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
96
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
97
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-05, 51-61, 81-89, 1201-04, 21-31, 52-60, 81-88, 1301-06, 2130, 51-63, 1401-09, 21-59, 82-89, 1502-04, 21-24.
98
Muzaffar Chishti, Fay Hipsman, & Isabel Ball, Fifty Years On, The 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act Continues to Reshape the United States,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INSTIT.
(Oct.
15,
2015),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fifty-years-1965-immigration-andnationality-act-continues-reshape-united-states.
99
Id. There are still some versions of quotas in the current system present for
certain types of family-based immigration, often referred to as “lotteries.” Id.
100
Chishti et al., supra note 98.
101
8 U.S.C. § 1558. This section is also labeled as § 209 of the INA.
95
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exceptions to that general rule, 102 (2) conditions of granting
asylum,103 (3) the purpose of establishing and the process of
terminating the status of asylum,104 and (4) the procedure involved in
applying for asylum.105
The next vital piece of asylum legislation, even though it did
not directly address the issue of asylum, was the Refugee Act of
1980.106 The Refugee Act introduces the key language in asylum
determinations – a “well-founded fear of persecution.”107 While the
language in this statute applies mainly to refugees, the immigration
legal system uses the same language to determine the credentials of
an asylum claim.108
Another noteworthy piece of legislation that defined asylum
law is the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).109 While the INA and the Refugee Act of
1980 both establish the scope of requirements for an asylum claim,
the IIRIRA outlines the relevant factors and procedure involved in

102

Id. at §1158(a).
Id. at §1158(b). These conditions include: eligibility, burden of proof,
determination of credibility, exceptions to the general rules, and the treatment of
parties that join the applicant in their application. Id.
104
Id. at §1158(c).
105
Id. at §1158(d).
106
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). While refugees
are very similar to asylum seekers, it is important to maintain each in a separate
category because refugees are outside of the United States when they make their
petition but asylum seekers are inside of the United States, or currently at a U.S.
port of entry, when they make their petitions. Refugees and Asylees, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/immigrationstatistics/refugees-asylees.
107
94 Stat. 12.
108
Refugee
Act
of
1980,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES
FOUND.,
https://www.archivesfoundation.org/documents/refugee-act-1980 (last visited Sept.
29, 2020).
109
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. While the
IIRIRA provides a distinct set of rules, the actual piece of legislation was
incorporated into the INA as part of Section 212. See Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, Acting Associate Director Domestic Operations Directorate, Lori
Scialabba, Associate Director, Refugee, Asylum and International Operations
Directorate, & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief, Office of Policy & Strategy,
Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections
212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs. (May 6, 2009).
103
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deportation if asylum is not granted.110 The IIRIRA was designed to
improve and heighten border control by imposing criminal penalties
for certain crimes that are deemed to be removable offenses. 111
Specifically, there are two main provisions in this statute that are
relevant to asylum seekers. 112 First, the IIRIRA allows for the
deportation of undocumented immigrants who commit a
misdemeanor or a felony.113 Second, the IIRIRA mandates that
immigrants who are unlawfully present in the United States between
180 to 365 days must remain outside the United States for three years
unless they are pardoned114 Furthermore, if they remain in the United
States undocumented for over one year, they must stay outside the
United States for ten years, unless they have a waiver. 115 If an
110

Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, LEGAL INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_re
sponsibility_act (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). This Act not only applies to asylum
but also for other situations where an undocumented immigrant is removed for any
reason. Id.
111
Id.
112
See INA § 212(a)(9)(A), (B)(i)(I)-(II).
113
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110;
see Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
2067, 2074-75 (2017) (discussing the lack of distinction the IIRIRA makes
between different levels of crimes). This is important to note because one of the
main reasons for denial of an asylum application is generally based on the applicant
having a criminal background in the United States (no matter how remote, isolated,
or minor of a crime it is). Id.; 72 FR 53013 § 1513(e) (2007) (setting aside victims
of crime and individuals seeking a U-visa as a class of non-deportable people).
There is an exception for victims of a crime or victims of trafficking that were
forced to commit crimes against their free will; however, the general rule is that
anything on immigrants’ criminal records is a threat to their status in the country
(especially when attempting to claim asylum). Illegal Immigrant Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110.
114
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110;
Conversation with Rajat Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Nov. 11,
2020 at 9:30 AM EST. This section of the IIRIRA is important for asylum seekers
because asylum seekers need to be inside the United States (and their family
members attaching to their petition must be inside the United States as well) in
order for their asylum claim to be processed). Id.
115
Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110;
Conversation with Rajat Shankar formerly from Touro Law Center on Nov. 11,
2020 at 9:30 AM EST. This ban can become a permanent bar to entry under the
IIRIRA. Id. If someone has a three- or ten-year bar placed upon him or her and
they still attempt to reenter the country, the immigrant can be facing a permanent
ban from the country. Id.
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immigrant stays past the specified guidelines in the IIRIRA without
obtaining the waiver or pardon, they must wait ten years before they
can apply for a waiver.116
The legislature has been the least active branch in establishing
asylum law over the past couple of decades when compared to the
actions of the executive and judicial branches. 117 The major
exceptions to this general rule come from the Bush 118 and Obama119
Administrations, which worked with Congress to issue temporary
grants of citizenship to people who would otherwise not qualify for
asylum, but still feared returning to their home countries.
B.

Supreme Court
1.

General Constitutional Power

Out of the three branches of the federal government, the
judiciary has the narrowest power to regulate immigration law under
the Constitution.120 While the Constitution provides limited power to
the judicial branch to create immigration law, the Supreme Court
shaped federal immigration law in three key ways. First, in the
pivotal case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court established that
immigration regulation is a responsibility reserved solely for the

116

Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, supra note 110.
D’vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through
History, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-throughhistory.
118
Development, Relief, and Education for Immigrant Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter DREAM Act].
119
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.
(Feb.
4,
2021),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-forchildhood-arrivals-daca; President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents Program
(DAPA),
NAT’L
IMMIGR.
L.
CTR.
(Nov.
26,
2014),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-reform-and-executiveactions/dapasummary.
120
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2. There is nothing mentioned in Article III that gives the
Supreme Court original or appellate jurisdiction over asylum, or other general
immigration, cases. Id. The only grant in the Constitution that comes close is the
authority to have appellate jurisdiction over cases that “aris[e] under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority.” Id.
117
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federal government, not the individual states. 121 Second, in the cases
that followed Chy Lung, the Court helped define the scope of federal
immigration powers by setting boundaries for the other two
competing branches.122 Finally, the power of judicial review adds an
important layer of protection for the immigrants going through the
system, albeit in a limited fashion,123 in an attempt to ensure the
immigration process is fair and accurate. 124
2.

Major Cases Prior to the Trump
Administration

Prior to the Trump Administration, the Supreme Court
decided five cases that shaped the form of current asylum law.125
The Supreme Court directly addressed the modern-day
concept of asylum-based immigration for the first time126 in INS v.

121

Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (holding it was unconstitutional for the
California legislature to pass a law excluding certain immigrants, except upon
payment of a bond, because the power to control admission of aliens belongs solely
to the national government); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
(upholding the Chy Lung ruling).
122
Vincent J. Cannato, Our Evolving Immigration Policy, NAT’L AFFS. (Fall 2012),
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/our-evolving-immigrationpolicy.
123
Background on Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(June
1,
2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/background-judicialreview-immigration-decisions. Congress has set up many restrictions on the types
of arguments available for judicial review on appeal in immigration decisions. Id.
Some of these restrictions include the inability to challenge: “discretionary”
determinations by immigration judges and officers, eligibility requirements for
asylum, expedited removal proceedings, and cases where there is a criminal record
(regardless of how minor the offense). Id.
124
Id.
125
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415 (1999); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547
U.S. 183 (2006); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010).
126
While there are other earlier cases that mention asylum-based immigration, such
as Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971), Cardoza-Fonseca is the first
one to address asylum-based immigration as its own category (Rosenberg
categorized the respondent’s claim as a refugee claim rather than a stand-alone
asylum claim). Rosenberg, 402 U.S. at 56. See Deborah Anker, U.S. Immigration
and Asylum Policy: A Brief Historical Perspective, 13 In Defense of the Alien 74,
82 (1990) (referring to Cardoza-Fonseca as a “beacon” in the federal judiciary
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Cardoza-Fonseca127 in 1987. The respondent was a Nicaraguan
citizen who entered the United States as a visitor and remained in the
country longer than she was permitted. 128 When deportation
proceedings began, the respondent applied to withhold her order of
deportation as well as for asylum.129 Her basis for asylum was that
her brother was tortured due to his political beliefs and that the
Sandinstas would persecute and torture her to discover her brother’s
whereabouts if she returned to Nicaragua. 130 The immigration court
and the BIA held that the respondent did not establish a credible fear
based on a “more likely than not” standard of proof.131 However, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard of proof
to establish the credibility of an applicant’s fear of persecution should
not be based on a typical percentage. 132 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
held that the more appropriate standard to judge an applicant’s fear of
persecution is to evaluate whether the applicant has a “credible fear
of persecution.”133 The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's holding and determined that the BIA and lower immigration
court both abused their discretion by applying the incorrect standard;
therefore, this case was remanded to the lower courts for further
proceedings based on the “well-founded fear of persecution”
standard.134
In 1999, the Supreme Court heard the next foundational case
that specifically addressed asylum law – INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.135
The respondent was burning buses, assaulting passengers, and
vandalizing private property in Guatemala, his native country. 136 The
respondent claimed that these acts were done to protest the
Guatemalan government. 137 He then sought asylum in the United

approach to asylum policy after the lower courts slowly beginning to veer from the
intended meaning of the INA).
127
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
128
Id. at 424.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 424-25.
131
Id. at 425.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 449.
135
526 U.S. 415 (1999).
136
Id. at 418.
137
Id.
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States due to his expressed fear of persecution for his earlier political
activities in Guatemala. 138
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, which held that the case should be remanded to the
BIA for further factual analysis of three factors. 139 The three factors
the Ninth Circuit focused on were: (1) the balancing test between the
severity of Aguirre’s offenses against the threat of political
persecution,140 (2) the qualification of atrocities of Aguirre’s acts in
comparison with others it faced in the past, 141 and (3) the
determination of whether Aguirre’s acts were politically necessary or
successful.142 The Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s argument
because neither the Attorney General nor the BIA is required to
balance those factors under the INA since a grant of asylum is a
discretionary judgment.143 Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a
unanimous ruling that the matter should be remanded to the circuit
court for further proceedings to be analyzed using the proper
methods, excluding the prior factors the Ninth Circuit originally
considered.144 While the Court did not issue a definitive ruling in this
case, Aguirre-Aguirre contributed immeasurably to the interpretation
of asylum law. Not only did this case grant the Attorney General and
BIA great deference to enforce asylum law, 145 especially when
establishing the credible fear of political persecution, but this
decision also further defined the scope of deportable offenses of a
“serious nonpolitical crime” under the INA.146
138

Id.
Id. at 423.
140
Id. at 418.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 427-30. While the UN handbook requires the balancing of those factors,
especially requiring administrative agencies to “consider[] whether the acts
committed ‘were grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective’. . . [t]he
political nature of the offenses would be ‘more difficult to accept’ if they involved
‘acts of an atrocious nature.’” Id. at 428 (quoting Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d
521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting U.N. Handbook, P152, at 36)). Furthermore, the
Supreme Court says the handbook “may be a useful interpretive aid, but it is not
binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or the United States Courts.” Id. at 427.
144
Id. at 433. While the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the lower court that
the case should be remanded for further proceedings, the Court did not agree with
the Ninth Circuit’s rationale as to why it should be remanded. Id. at 419.
145
Id. at 424-25.
146
Id. at 427-30.
139
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In 2002, the Supreme Court decided INS v. Ventura.147 In this
case, the respondent was seeking asylum for fear of persecution from
the Guatemalan government and guerrilla forces.148 Following the
reasoning in Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court held that asylum decisions
are discretionary and administrative agencies, such as the INS, should
be granted broad deference when making those decisions.149
Additionally, while threats of danger were certainly elevated in
Guatemala during this time, 150 the Justices rejected the respondent’s
asylum claims because “‘the underlying motivation in most asylum
claims now appears to stem from common crime and/or personal
vengeance,’ i.e. not politics . . . only party leaders or high-profile
activists generally would be vulnerable to such harassment and only
in their home communities.’”151 The Court believed that the
respondent could return safely to his home country, just not his local
community.152 By refusing to grant the respondent the immigration
relief he requested, the Justices in Ventura established that an
applicant must have a well-founded fear of persecution in order to
have a successful asylum claim. 153 While the concept of the “wellfounded fear of persecution” is not a new requirement to successfully
establish an asylum claim, 154 the Justices transformed the meaning of
that terminology to grant a much broader sense of discretion to the
government to cast doubt on an applicant’s credibility than the Court
previously intended in Cardoza-Fonseca.155
147

537 U.S. 12 (2002).
Id. at 17-18.
149
Id. at 16.
150
Id. at 17-18.
151
Id. (citing Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dept. of State,
Guatemala -- Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions at 4, 8 (June 1997)
(citation omitted)).
152
Id. at 18. It is not enough for an individual to have a fear of persecution to
return to a specific area in his or her native country. Id. In order to establish a
credible fear, the individual must fear persecution if forced to return to any part of
his or her native country. Id.
153
Id.
154
See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (establishing the applicant’s “persecution
or well-founded fear of persecution” as the necessary standard to evaluate the
credibility of an applicant’s asylum claim).
155
See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 (prioritizing the powers of the executive branch by
having the first sentence of the opinion reference the broad discretion given to the
Attorney General under the INA to evaluate the credibility of an applicant’s claim
of persecution).
148
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After Ventura, the Supreme Court did not issue another
substantive asylum ruling until Gonzales v. Thomas156 in 2006. In
Gonzales, the respondents were a South African family seeking
asylum in the United States.157 The respondents argued they should
be granted asylum because they had a credible fear of persecution
due to their political opinions and membership in a particular social
group.158 The immigration and BIA courts focused mainly on the
political and racial elements of their asylum claim and denied the
respondents’ petition for asylum. 159 However, the Ninth Circuit
overruled the lower courts and held that the BIA failed to consider a
family unit as a “particular social group” since “certain ‘kinship ties’
fall within the statutory term.”160
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision due
to the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous failure to remand the case for further
proceedings on the issue of a “particular social group.”161 The
Justices agreed that the central issue of the case, whether a family is a
“particular social group” for the purposes of asylum, was not
determined in the lower courts. 162 While the Court did not issue a
definitive ruling in this case as to whether a family is a “particular
social group,” recent case law has interpreted this case and other

156

547 U.S. 183 (2006).
Id. at 184.
158
Id. The respondents argued the family collective constituted a “particular social
group” because of their race and kinship with a particularly well-known, racist,
white South African. Id.; Liliya Paraketsova, Why Guidance From the Supreme
Court is Required in Redefining the Particular Social Group Definition in Refugee
Law, 51 U. OF MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 437, 437-38 (2018). Courts, including the
Supreme Court, have struggled to define firm guidelines to establish a “particular
social group.” Id. The BIA in Matter of A-B- helps provide some guidelines to
identify “particular social groups”; however, these guidelines have been not as
helpful in creating a straightforward procedure for application. 27 I&N Dec. 316,
316 (A.G. 2018). The court in Matter of A-B- held that a “particular social group”
is: (1) based on a “common immutable characteristic” that is “socially distinct
within the society in question,” (2) the “central reason for [his or] her persecution,”
(3) stated with specificity, and (4) separate from the harm asserted in the
application for asylum. Id.
159
Gonzalez, 547 U.S. at 184.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 185.
162
Id. at 186-87.
157
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lower court decisions to allow certain types of family units to fall
under the statutory definition of a “particular social group.”163
The last important asylum case decided prior to the Trump
Administration was Kucana v. Holder 164 in 2010. The Court in this
case upheld the power of judicial review in asylum cases that
involved violations under the IIRIRA.165 In this case, the petitioner
was a citizen of Albania who entered the United Stated in 1995 and
did not leave when his visa expired, which is a deportable violation
under the IIRIRA.166 While the Court regularly gave significant
deference to the executive branch and Congress in issuing
immigration-based decisions, the Justices in Kucana maintained that
the separation of powers is fundamental and must be respected,
especially when the judicial branch has significantly diminished
power when compared to the executive and legislative branch. 167
C.

The President
1.

General Constitutional Power

The Constitution does not explicitly grant the executive
branch any immigration-specific powers.168 However, the executive
Andrew R. Arthur, Attorney General Sets Standards for ‘Family’ as a
‘Particular Social Group’ and Reiterates His Authority to Interpret Immigration
Laws, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://cis.org/Arthur/AttorneyGeneral-Sets-Standards-Family-Particular-Social-Group; see 27 I&N Dec. 581
(A.G. 2019) (raising the bar to qualify as a “particular social group”). While the
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the term “particular social group,” the BIA
has recognized certain clans and subclans as “particular social groups,” especially
well-known families or those connected to well-known individuals. Id. However,
most nuclear families are not inherently socially distinct. Id. Therefore, they do
not qualify as “particular social groups.” Id.
164
558 U.S. 233 (2010).
165
Id. at 249.
166
Id. at 239-40.
167
Id. at 237.
168
There are some explicitly stated executive powers that have been interpreted to
have immigration consequences. Study Guide: The Rights of Refugees, supra note
90. One of these powers is the broad definition of the Article II, Section III power
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers” seen in Zivotofsky v. Kerry by
holding that the President has the power to recognize certain groups of people for
purposes of immigration paperwork (which is inherent to their power to receive).
See 576 U.S. 1 (2015). Another one of these powers that have been interpreted
broadly in favor of increased executive control in the realm of immigration law is
163
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branch has acquired a great deal of power to control, monitor, and
regulate immigration law through several channels created by the
separation of powers among the branches of government. First, as
discussed in Sections IV(A)(1) and (2) of this Note, Congress has
delegated much of its enumerated and inherent constitutional power
to regulate immigration to the executive branch. 169 Second, as
discussed in Sections IV(B)(1) and (2) of this Note, the Supreme
Court has regularly held in favor of a broad exercise of executive
power when regulating the various areas of immigration law,
especially domestic asylum law. 170 Third, with the expansion of the
administrative state, both the courts and Congress have given broad
deference to agency decisions and have allowed a vast array of
administrative policies as long as there is a legitimate purpose, which
is not a high burden.171 Finally, the other branches have allowed the
executive branch to enjoy an increased presence in immigration law
by justifying their acquiescence under the language of the Take Care
Clause of Article II, § 3 of the Constitution.172
2.

Key Executive Orders / Programs Before the
Trump Administration

There are three key presidential policies that helped define
current asylum law prior to the Trump Administration.173
Former President Carter passed The Consultation on the
Admission of Refugees in 1980. 174 This executive order serves, in
the power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Laura S. Trice,
Adjudication By Fiat: The Need For Procedural Safeguards In Attorney General
Review Of Board Of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766,
1766-67 (2010) (discussing how the Attorney General, a key player in the
executive branch, has broad discretion to enforce federal immigration laws under
the current statutes).
169
See supra notes 92-94, 122 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 95, 120-67 and accompanying text.
171
Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Couns., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
172
U.S. CONST. art. II, §3.
173
Exec. Order. No. 12208, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,789 (Apr. 15, 1980); Memorandum
from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 15, 2012); WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “ZERO TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION
POLICY (July 20, 2018).
174
Exec. Order. No. 12208, 45 Fed. Reg. 25,789 (Apr. 15, 1980).
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part, to amend sections of the INA and the Refugee Act of 1980. 175
Furthermore, this order creates powers in the executive branch to
monitor refugee and asylum law in three variations. First, the order
allows the president to delegate certain types of immigration powers
to the Secretary of State or Attorney General, both members of the
President’s Cabinet.176 Second, the order grants the delegation of
immigration oversight power to the United States Coordinator for
Refugee Affairs, a member of the executive branch.177 Finally, the
President reserved several asylum-centered rights for himself in the
order including the ability to “specify special circumstances for
purposes of qualifying persons as refugees under Section
101(a)(42)(B) [of the INA]”178 and “to fix the number of refugees to
be admitted under Section 207(b) [of the INA].” 179
The next two central pre-Trump executive programs
addressing aspects of asylum law came from the Obama
Administration through presidential memoranda.180
The first
program is called “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children.” 181 This
program has also been referred to as the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) Program. 182 Similar to DACA’s
175

Id. at § 1-101(a)-(b). These statutes have been previously identified by this Note
as key statutes that guided the creation of United States asylum law. See supra
Section IV(A)(2).
176
Exec. Order. No. 12208 at § 1-101(a).
177
Id. at § 1-101(b).
178
Id. at § 1-103(a).
179
Id. at § 1-103(c).
180
As mentioned previously in this Note, there is also the DREAM Act originating
from the Bush, Jr. Administration in 2001. Supra note 118. However, this
program will not be discussed in detail in this Note because it has not yet cleared
the Congressional floor after at least ten versions of the bill. The Dream Act,
DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-actdaca-and-other-policies-designed-protect-dreamers.
181
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 173.
182
The Obama Administration issued a parallel program two years after DACA for
the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents – the Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) Program.
However, this Note only addresses DACA in depth because: (1) DAPA was
discontinued in 2017, (2) there are no present, or future, plans to reinstate the
program, and (3) the DACA Program is essentially the same as the DAPA program
(the only difference is that DACA applies to the children and DAPA applies to
their parents). See Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for
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predecessor, the DREAM Act, and DACA’s parental counterpart,
DAPA, DACA is only meant to serve as a temporary solution that
allows people who qualify for the program to stay in the country for a
longer period of time than their status allows.183 This extra time then
allows people in the program to apply for citizenship while they
remain safe from deportation due to their provisional immigration
status.184 While DACA, and the acts and programs similar to DACA,
do not specifically address asylum law, they deal indirectly with
asylum seekers. Once a person is admitted to these programs, they
can apply for more permanent forms of relief and a significant
number of DACA recipients – or family members of DACA
recipients – choose to file asylum claims due to the dangerous
conditions in their native country. 185
The second Obama Administration program that addressed
asylum was the Family Case Management Program (“FCMP”),
which was issued in January 2016 as a pilot program.186 Unlike the
other asylum policies and decisions discussed previously in this Note,
the FCMP did not deal directly with the process of asylum or status
of the applicant. Instead, the FCMP provided alternatives to
deportation for asylum seekers in several large cities throughout the
United States.187 Some of these alternatives in the FCMP included
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(June
15,
2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providingdeferred-action-parents-americans-and-lawful; ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44764, THE DACA AND DAPA DEFERRED ACTION INITIATIVES:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2017).
183
Memorandum on Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA), 2021 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. DCPD202100064 (Jan. 25, 2021).
184
Doug Mentes, What Are the Options for DACA Recipients?, SUPER LAWYERS
(May 21, 2020), https://www.superlawyers.com/oregon/article/what-are-theoptions-for-daca-recipients/61de5ce1-896b-4a7c-92d6-d0661c841bb0.html.
185
Immigration Relief for DACA Recipients Based on Fear of Return, UNIV. OF
CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF L. CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD. (Feb. 2018),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/CGRS%20DACA%20Fear%20of%
20Return%20Claims%20Practice%20Advisory_02-28-2018.pdf.
186
Jane C. Timm, This Obama-Era Pilot Program Kept Asylum-Seeking Migrant
Families Together. Trump Canceled It., NBC NEWS (June 24, 2018, 8:54 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/obama-era-pilotprogram-kept-asylum-seeking-migrant-families-together-n885896.
187
Report of the ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENF’T
(Oct.
7,
2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/acfrc-report-final-
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providing “case management, referrals for support services, and legal
orientation, in partnership with community-based non-governmental
organizations, in order to make sure that vulnerable families’ most
urgent needs were met and they had the information they needed to
comply with legal obligations.” 188 While the Trump Administration
eliminated the FCMP in June 2017, 189 the Biden Administration has
already begun reversing some of former President Trump’s
immigration policies;190 furthermore, President Biden has stated that
a key priority in his immigration policy is to create a task force to
reunite families 191 – something that the FCMP was designed to do. 192
D.

International Norms and Treaties

Although this Note focuses on domestic law, our country’s
asylum laws are certainly influenced by international norms and
treaties.193 Therefore, a brief discussion of these sources of
inspiration is necessary to understand the foundations of asylum law,
especially the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees
(“Geneva Refugee Convention” or “Geneva Convention”) 194 and the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
102016.pdf. These five metropolitan areas include: Baltimore / Washington D.C.,
New York City / Newark, Chicago, Miami, and Los Angeles. Id.
188
Ruthie Epstein, The Tried-and-True Alternatives to Detaining Immigrant
Families, ACLU (June 22, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrantsrights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/tried-and-true-alternatives-detaining.
189
Report of the ICE Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers, supra
note 187.
190
Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Biden Issues Orders to Dismantle
Trump’s ‘America First’ Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/politics/biden-immigration-executiveorders-trump.html.
191
Exec. Order No. 14011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,273 (2021).
192
See The Family Case Management Program: Why Case Management Can and
Must Be Part of the US Approach to Immigration, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N
(June
13,
2019),
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/researchresources/the-family-case-management-program-why-case-management-can-andmust-be-part-of-the-us-approach-to-immigration.
193
While there are several sources of international influences on United States
asylum law, this Note will focus on the two primary treaties that have formed the
foundational backbone of domestic asylum law in the country – the Geneva
Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Convention Against Torture of 1987.
194
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES, G.A. Res. 2198(XXI) (1967).
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Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture” or
“CAT”).195
The Geneva Refugee Convention was first created in 1951 but
was then amended in 1967. 196 Similar to the Refugee Act of 1980,
the Geneva Refugee Convention focuses on refugees and not
asylees.197 However, three central aspects of the Geneva Convention
are fundamental to the development of asylum law. First, the Geneva
Convention’s core principle of “non-refoulement, which asserts that
refugee[s] should not be returned to a country where they face serious
threats to their life or freedom,” has established international custom
regarding the required treatment of those seeking safety in a foreign
country.198 Further, American asylum law’s “fear of persecution”
language mirrors the Geneva Convention’s stated policy to not force
refugees to return to “a country where they face serious threats to
their life or freedom.”199 Second, the definition used to define
refugees and asylees in the Convention is very similar to the
definition used in American asylum law – “someone who is unable or
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” 200
Finally, while not stated explicitly in United States asylum law, the
rights provided to those seeking refuge under the Geneva Convention
establish an international standard of treatment, which those pushing
for immigration reform in the United States seek to mirror in our
country.201
The Convention Against Torture was ratified and adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1984 and became effective in 1987. 202
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, G.A. Res. 39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE].
196
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, supra note 194, at p. 1.
197
Id. at “Preamble,” p. 13.
198
The 1951 Refugee Convention, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2021).
199
Id.
200
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, supra note 194, at
“Introductory Note,” p. 3.
201
Id. at art. 3-5, 12-30 (discussing the rights of refugees, and those in the “same
circumstances,” under the Geneva Convention).
202
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195.
195
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While the Geneva Convention is a persuasive international norm, the
Convention Against Torture was formally adopted into United States
immigration law through 8 C.F.R. § 208.16-208.18.203 Even though
the Convention Against Torture provides broader protections than
asylum, such as eliminating the defined groups for fear of persecution
and allowing individuals with felony records to obtain protection,
CAT has helped the development of asylum law in three ways. First,
CAT claims serve as alternative means to file claims that are
unsuccessful under asylum. 204 Although CAT requires torture or fear
of torture from someone acting in an “official capacity” in the
applicant’s home country, 205 this program serves as a viable second
option for those who do not fit within the rigid groups of people
allowed to assert asylum claims. 206 In this sense, the Convention
Against Torture alleviate some of the burden on the asylum system
and allows fewer asylum claims to place a strain on the alreadydelayed asylum system. 207 Second, CAT follows similar principles
as the Geneva Convention which focuses on the inherent rights of
individuals and upholds the belief that all individuals that fall under
the Convention Against Torture are due universal respect as human
beings.208 Finally, like the Geneva Convention, the Convention
Against Torture reaffirms the concept that individuals should not be
punished by a forced return to their countries when they reasonably
do not feel safe to return.209 These guiding principles from CAT and
the Geneva Convention, in turn, shape – at least in theory and in
intention – American asylum law.
V.

ASYLUM DURING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

As stated previously in this Note, the executive branch has
become the most active branch in regulating federal immigration
203

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Against Torture,
Memorandum Addressed to the Regional Office for the United States of America
& the Caribbean (Mar. 10, 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/5859a0464.pdf.
204
Aruna Sury, Qualifying for Protection Under the Convention Against Torture,
IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.ilrc.org/qualifyingprotection-under-convention-against-torture.
205
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195, at art. 1.
206
Sury, supra note 204.
207
Id.
208
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 195.
209
Id.
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law.210 Former President Trump embraced the role of the executive
branch’s expanding power within the realm of immigration law and
was more active than the prior administrations combined in the
field.211 Through the Trump Administration’s increased executive
presence in immigration law, in conjunction with a more active
Supreme Court,212 President Trump sought to regulate, reshape, and
restrict immigration, especially asylum-based immigration, into the
United States.213 Unlike this Note’s previous discussion of preTrump asylum policies,214 this section will mainly focus on the
executive and judicial branches’ actions during the years of the

210

See supra Section IV(C)(1).
Compare Drew DeSilver, Executive Actions on Immigration Have Long History,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/11/21/executive-actions-on-immigration-have-long-history
(summarizing the eleven major immigration-based executive orders from 1961 to
2014)
with
Document
Search,
FED.
REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/search (Write “immigration” in the
search bar; then click “Advanced Search”; in the field that says “Document
Category,” click on “Presidential Document”; then press the magnifying glass or
search button) (showing the seventy-four immigration orders former President
Trump
issued in a single four-year term).
212
Cases
–
Immigration
and
Naturalization,
OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/issues/164 (last visited Feb. 7, 2021) (showing the sixteen
Supreme Court decisions curtailing immigration in various ways during Trump’s
four-year term to fourteen immigration decisions over the almost thirty-year period
between the Reagan and Obama Administrations – with some administrations
having no immigration-based Supreme Court decisions at all such as Presidents
Clinton and Bush, Sr.).
213
Even though the Trump Administration has had a significant impact in many
areas of immigration law, similar to previous sections of this Note, the focus of this
discussion will be on policies having an impact on asylum law. Other areas of the
immigration law that President Trump was very active in include employmentbased immigration (through his “America First” agenda), visa requirements
(imposing stricter requirements to obtain a visa as well as ending the diversity visa
lottery), green card requirements (eliminating eligibility for those deemed to be a
“public charge”), supporting for-profit detention centers, and an attempt to remove
foreign students from the United States during the pandemic. See, e.g., Amadu
Jacky Kaba, United States Immigration Policies in the Trump Era, 9 SOCIO. MIND
316 (2019); Kandel, supra note 173; Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump
Immigration
Policy,
FORBES
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/fact-check-and-review-oftrump-immigration-policy/?sh=1ec1d25f56c0.
214
See supra Section IV.
211
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Trump Administration.215 Also, to demonstrate the increase in
activity before and after the COVID-19 pandemic, this section will
divide the years of the Trump administration based on when the
World Health Organization officially declared the virus as a
pandemic in March of 2020. 216
A.

Before COVID-19 (November 2016 – February
2020)
1.

Supreme Court Decisions

During the four years of the Trump Administration, several
cases reached the Supreme Court regarding immigration law and five
cases have restricted asylum in accordance with President Trump’s
executive policies.217 The two important Court cases decided before
the pandemic were Jennings v. Rodriguez 218 and Trump v. Hawaii.219
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, respondent, Alejandro Rodriguez,
was a Mexican citizen who was a legal permanent resident of the
United States.220 In April 2004, Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of
drug and theft crimes. 221 Due to these convictions, the federal
government sought to remove the respondent from the country
pursuant to the protocol in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 222
After over three years of detention, Rodriguez filed a habeas petition
claiming that his continued detention without an individualized bond
215

This section will not address the actions of Congress during the Trump
Administration because Congress was largely inactive in immigration law during
this period (other than hosting debates on some executive proposals). See
Catherine Rampell, Trump Has Bulldozed Over Congress on Immigration. Will
Lawmakers Ever Act?, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:09 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-bulldozed-over-congress-onimmigration-will-lawmakers-ever-act/2019/11/14/67401466-0722-11ea-8292c46ee8cb3dce_story.html.
216
Domenico Cucinotta & Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a
Pandemic, 91 ACTA BIOMEDICA 157, 157 (2020).
217
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); GuerreroLasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020).
218
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
219
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
220
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 838.
221
Id.
222
Id.
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hearing was a violation of his due process rights.223 The respondent’s
habeas claim was consolidated with other individuals’ claims similar
to his, most of the other claimants being non-citizen asylum
seekers.224 After becoming certified as a class, Rodriguez and the
other complainants alleged that the prolonged detention in ICE
centers, without clear and convincing evidence that such detention is
warranted,225 constituted a violation of their constitutional rights.226
The district court granted a preliminary injunction which required the
government to provide each member of the class a bond hearing
unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence,
that continued detention was justified. 227 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court but limited the
guarantee of a bond hearing to only those who were detained at least
six months.228
In a plurality opinion by the Court, 229 the Justices reaffirmed
the large grant of authority to the executive branch regarding issues
of immigration, detention, and removal. 230 The Court specifically
relied on the Attorney General’s broad decision-making power in
immigration cases.231 The Court justified the Attorney General’s
immense scope of power within the field of immigration by reasoning
that the default rule of the alien detention and expedited removal
statute232 is to allow the Attorney General to have the power to issue
warrants for the arrest and detention of aliens pending the outcome of
their removal proceedings. 233 While there are a few limited
exceptions, the applicability of these exceptions is also left to the
223

Id.
Id. at 838-39.
225
Id. at 839. Examples of when a prolonged detention is warranted include if the
detainee is a flight risk, involved in the witness protection program, or a danger to
himself / herself or others. Id. at 848.
226
Id. at 861.
227
Id. at 839.
228
Id. This limitation did not matter for members of this specific class, because
they all met the qualification of being detained for at least six months. Id.
229
Justice Alito wrote the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy joined Alito’s opinion in full. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined the
opinion with the exception of the discussion regarding the Court’s jurisdiction in
this case.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26.
233
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837.
224
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discretion of the Attorney General. 234 The Court further held that the
lower courts improperly applied the constitutional-avoidance
canon235 by over relying on Zadvydas v. Davis in order to impose a
time limit to require a bond hearing; meanwhile, the plain language
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-26 makes no such mention of this
requirement.236
While this case focused primarily on bond hearings for
detained aliens, it also had a significant impact on asylum law in two
important ways. First, Mr. Rodriguez and many other detained
members of the class applied for asylum and were currently facing
removal proceedings.237 As discussed earlier in this Note, the
removal procedures for a failed asylum claim are just as fundamental
in shaping asylum law as the qualifications for the program itself. 238
Therefore, the Court’s review of the applicability and language of the
alien detention and expedited removal statute is relevant to asylum
law under the Trump Administration. 239 The language of § 1225(b)
of the statute separates the removal and detention process for asylum
seekers whose cases are still pending from aliens in other
categories.240 However, the Court in this case grouped both types of
individuals together and held that, under § 1226 of the alien detention
and removal statute, that: (1) neither group is entitled to a bond
hearing regardless of the length of detention,241 (2) bond hearings are

234

Id. at 839 (referencing 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) which states that exceptions will be
granted “‘only if the Attorney General decides’ both that doing so is necessary for
witness-protection purposes and that the alien will not pose a danger or flight
risk”).
235
Id. at 836. The constitutional-avoidance canon allows a court to frame statutory
language that is subject to multiple interpretations in a way that avoids
interpretations that have the potential to raise serious constitutional problems. Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 859-60.
238
See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the
IIRIRA in shaping asylum law through establishing comprehensive removal
procedures).
239
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 870.
240
See id. at 844-45 (discussing the statutory distinction between removal of aliens
seeking asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1225 (b)(1) and removal of aliens not seeking
asylum under § 1225 (b)(2)).
241
Id.
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not constitutionally guaranteed for either group, 242 and (3) both
groups are eligible to be placed in expedited removal proceedings. 243
Four months after the Court’s holding in Jennings, the
Justices issued another ruling in Trump v. Hawaii that had a large
impact on asylum law.244 The petitioners in this case challenged
Executive Order Nos. 13,769 and 13,780, which were issued by
President Trump in February and March of 2017, respectively. 245
These proclamations suspended the entry of individuals for ninety
days for those coming from seven countries that had been previously
identified as heightened terrorism risks.246 While the Court said
multiple times throughout the opinion that these proclamations do not
apply to asylum seekers,247 Justice Breyer’s dissent also highlighted
2018 statistics from the State Department that show that this selflabeled Muslim ban 248 does have a significant curtailing effect on
asylum and refugee seekers from these countries. 249 The majority
opinion upheld these policies under the rational basis standard
because of the expansive powers given to the federal government in
regulating immigration250 and because of the immigration and
national security issues involved in the issuance of these
proclamations.251 Furthermore, the Court attempted to distinguish
this broad grant of power to the executive branch from the polarizing
ruling in Korematsu v. United States.252 Both cases deal with the
intentional targeting of specific groups of people for the generalized
purpose of “national security;” however, the Court in Trump v.
Hawaii said that individuals who are U.S. citizens receive different
242

Id. at 845.
Id. at 837.
244
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2431 (2018).
245
Id. at 2403-04.
246
Id. at 2403. The seven countries included in this ninety day ban are Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Id. (referencing Executive Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 3(c) (2017)).
247
Id. at 2406, 2422.
248
David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump Equated His Travel Ban with a Muslim
Ban, CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozentimes-trump-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban (discussing twelve separate occasions
when President Trump explicitly referred to these proclamations as a “Muslim
ban”).
249
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2431.
250
Id. at 2415.
251
Id. at 2417.
252
Id. at 2423.
243
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treatment from people who are seeking entry into the country but do
not have any status in the country yet. 253 Along with the
discriminatory effect this case has on asylum seekers from targeted
countries, this case affects asylum law because it reaffirms the broad
delegation to the executive branch in the field of immigration,
including issues affecting asylum applicants – either directly or
indirectly.254
2. Executive Orders / Formal Presidential
Statements
Former President Trump led the most active administration
regarding the executive branch’s role in implementing immigration
policies.255 While many Trump administration executive orders and
presidential memorandums focused on restricting immigration as a
whole, four main official executive policies affected asylum-based
immigration.256
The first of these executive policies was the executive order
called
“Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements,” which was issued on January 25, 2017.257 In this
executive order, President Trump sought to secure the southern
border through a variety of tactics including manning the border with
more federal agents,258 terminating the practice of “catch and
release,”259 and encouraging streamlined deportation proceedings. 260
253

Id.
Id. at 2415.
255
See N.Y. Times Editorial Board, Trump’s Overhaul of Immigration is Worse
Than
You
Think,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
10,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/10/opinion/sunday/trump-immigration-childseparations.html; Todd Schulte, Tearing Families Apart – The Impact of Trump’s
Immigration Agenda, FWD.US (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.fwd.us/news/theimpact-of-trumps-immigration-agenda; Aline Barros, How Trump Administration
Dramatically Reshaped US Immigration Policy, VOICE OF AM. (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:18
PM),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/immigration/how-trump-administrationdramatically-reshaped-us-immigration-policy.
256
Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (2017); Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,799 (2017); Exec. Order 13,888, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (2019); Migrant
Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols.
257
Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (2017).
258
Id. at § 8.
259
Id. at § 6. The order characterizes “catch and release” as a procedure “whereby
aliens are routinely released into the United States shortly after their apprehension
254
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Furthermore, this statement affirmatively stated a goal of this
administration is to reduce the amount of asylees and refugees
entering the country. 261 The order specifically targeted asylum, and
its partner program – refugee admission, by claiming asylees and
refugees “abuse” the system by looking for loopholes in the removal
guidelines.262 Trump’s order not only directly affected asylum law
through the intentional targeting of the program, but also unilaterally
granted more authority to the executive branch to carry out
immigration enforcement, especially by granting more power to
border patrol agents and ICE agents.
The next of Trump’s pre-COVID executive policies that had a
negative effect on asylum arose from another executive order issued
on January 25, 2017, called “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior
of the United States.”263 Unlike the first executive order discussed in
this section, this order does not have specific language targeting
asylees or refugees. Instead, one of the main goals of this order was
aimed at dismantling sanctuary cities and removing undocumented
immigrants who stayed in these cities.264 Even though asylum is not
mentioned specifically by name in this executive order, the attack on
sanctuary cities was a tough hit to asylees. The term “Sanctuary
City” has a direct connection to asylum-based immigration.265 The
term originated when the sanctuary movement started in the 1980s to
accommodate Salvadorians trying to escape the 1970s civil war for
fear of political persecution. 266 Sanctuary cities serve multiple
purposes to provide a safe refuge for undocumented immigrants
for violations of immigration law.” Id. However, that is a mischaracterization of
the procedure. “Catch and Release”: Frequently Asked Questions, JUST. FOR
IMMIGR.,
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigrantdetention/catch-and-release-frequently-asked-questions (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
While it is true that some apprehended immigrants are released, they are only
temporarily released pending their immigration court proceedings, which are still
monitored by DHS. Id.
260
Exec. Order 13,767, supra note 257 at §§ 2(b)-(d).
261
Id. at § 11(a).
262
Id. at § 11, 11(a).
263
Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (2017).
264
Id. at §§ 1, 9.
265
Rawle Andrews Jr. & Sanchita Bose, Sanctuary Cities? Asylum? Dreamers?
When a House is Not a Home: The Legal and Socioeconomic Implications of
National Populism on Local Governance and Individual Liberties, 21 UNIV. OF
D.C. L. REV. 75, 85 (2019).
266
Id.
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while giving them time to process their immigration claims.267 Some
of the policies these locations enforce in order to maintain a safe
environment for undocumented immigrants include prohibitions on
ICE arrests without a judicial warrant, unrestricted sharing of
immigration status with police and other city workers, and local
police cooperation with ICE to increase detentions.268 This safe
space is vital to asylum seekers because asylum applicants are
already seeking refuge from a dangerous situation in their home
country.269 By restricting access to these welcoming areas, the
Trump Administration made it much harder for asylum seekers to
assimilate into the country with ease and bide their time in a location
where they are not actively facing a life or death situation as they
wait, potentially for years, for their applications to process.270
The third initiative by the executive branch that attempted to
tear down asylum-based immigration was the Migrant Protection
Policy (“MPP” or the “Remain in Mexico Policy”). 271 The MPP was
a DHS initiative created by President Trump which states that
individuals attempting to cross the southern border without
documentation will be returned to Mexico and forced to wait outside
of the United States for the duration of their immigration
proceedings.272 This program was extremely detrimental to asylum
seekers because they are met with one of two options when they try
to enter through the southern border to flee serious persecution. First,
they will be turned around at the border and forced to return to their
home country.273 Or, second, they could choose to remain in

267

Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-policiesoverview.
268
Id.
269
See supra notes 10, 47 and accompanying text.
270
See generally Andrews & Bose, supra note 265 (discussing the overall
importance of sanctuary cities to undocumented immigrants and the overall effects
of President Trump’s executive order trying to eliminate them).
271
Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Allows ‘Remain in Mexico’ Program to
Continue,
NPR
(Mar.
11,
2020,
6:48
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814582798/u-s-supreme-court-allows-remain-inmexico-program-to-continue.
272
Migrant Protection Protocols, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols.
273
MPP is Still Happening – And There’s a New Threat, REFUGEE & IMMIGR. CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
&
LEGAL
SERVS.
(Oct.
19,
2020),
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inhumane conditions in Mexico while they wait for months, if not
years, to hear anything about their immigration court proceedings. 274
The final policy this Note will discuss from this portion of the
Trump Administration is the executive order issued on September 26,
2019, called “Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee
Resettlement.”275 This policy went somewhat hand in hand with
MPP in that it outsources immigrants to locations outside of the
United States. The main difference between MPP and this executive
order was that MPP is more focused on punishment and detention
whereas this order tries to revive the “safe third-country
agreements.”276 However, these agreements are problematic for
asylum seekers – especially those from Central American
countries.277 This is because individuals seeking asylum due to
persecution from gang member violence and political violence in
these countries could easily be sent back home to the dangerous
conditions they were facing, especially since Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador all had “safe third country agreements” with the
United States during the Trump Administration. 278
B.

Post COVID-19 (March 2020 – January 2021)
1.

Supreme Court Decisions

Once COVID was labeled as a pandemic, the Supreme Court
saw a remarkable number of immigration cases – specifically, nine

https://www.raicestexas.org/2020/10/19/mpp-is-still-happening-and-theres-a-newthreat.
274
Q&A: Trump Administration’s “Remain in Mexico” Program, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Jan. 29, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/29/qatrump-administrations-remain-mexico-program.
275
Exec. Order 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (2019).
276
Id. While this order does not mention the third country agreements specifically,
it talks about resettlement to other locations and countries that would be “best
environment for refugees.” Id. This is also the stated language when it comes to
the justification for the third country agreements.
277
Peniel Ibe, The Dangers of Trump’s "Safe Third Country" Agreements in
Central America, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (July 28, 2020),
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/dangers-trumps-safe-thirdcountry-agreements-central-america.
278
Id.
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cases in less than a year.279 Aligning itself with the Trump
Administration’s executive limitations placed on immigration and
asylum, the Supreme Court issued two central rulings that severely
impacted asylum applicants over the span of eleven months 280 –
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam281 and
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California.282
The Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam evaluated the issue of
whether an asylum seeker can file a petition for habeas corpus to
challenge the legality and constitutionality of his detention. 283 In this
case, respondent, Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Tamil from Sri
Lanka, entered the United States through the southern border. 284
Shortly thereafter, the respondent was detained for expedited
removal.285 Mr. Thuraissigiam tried to assert an asylum claim;
however, the asylum officer rejected his credible-fear claim – a
decision that was upheld by a supervising officer and the immigration
judge.286 In response to this denial, the respondent filed a motion for
habeas corpus in federal district court in order to obtain a new
opportunity to apply for asylum.287 In his petition, Mr. Thuraissigiam
asserted that he had a credible fear of persecution, and therefore
qualified for asylum, due to his minority group ethnicity and political
views.288 While the district court dismissed the petition, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and held
that the respondent’s expedited removal without a grant of habeas
corpus violated his constitutional rights.289
Review of the Supreme Court’s 2019-2020 Immigration Cases, NAT’L IMMIGR.
F. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://immigrationforum.org/article/review-of-the-supremecourts-2019-2020-immigration-cases.
280
Similar to other sections in this Note, this section will only discuss asylum cases
or cases that have a direct or indirect impact on asylum applicants. Therefore,
while the Court has decided several other immigration cases during this time, they
will not be discussed here. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020); GuerroLasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020); Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020).
281
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
282
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
283
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1981.
284
Id. at 1967.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id.
289
Id.
279
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The Justices, in a 7-2 opinion, with only Justices Sotomayor
and Kagan dissenting, ruled in favor of the Department of Homeland
Security and held that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
expedited removal proceedings violated the Suspension Clause and
Due Process Clause.290 Therefore, the case was reversed, remanded,
and accompanied with directions that the habeas corpus claim should
be dismissed.291 When evaluating the legitimacy of the Suspension
Clause claim, the Court looked at the historical meaning and intent of
habeas corpus under the language of the Suspension Clause in Article
1, Section 9, Clause 2. 292 Using a strict interpretation of habeas
corpus, the Court quickly dismissed Thuraissigiam’s Suspension
Clause claim, since he stated that the purpose of his habeas petition
was to obtain a new chance to file for asylum, not to specifically
challenge the legality of his detention.293 Furthermore, the Justices
held that the ability to challenge the finality of the immigration
officials’ decision was not a valid reason to invoke a habeas corpus
petition for a non-citizen and instead was a misinterpretation of
Supreme Court finality decision precedent. 294 As to the respondent’s
Due Process claim, the majority opinion held that: (1) Mr.
Thuraissigiam is not a citizen and therefore does not require the same
level of due process granted to citizens 295 and (2) even though noncitizens are granted due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
and statutory requirements of due process, the respondent received
the required amount of due process from the administrative and
executive decisions made by federal officers acting under the
authority of Congress.296 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg also wrote a
noteworthy concurring opinion which warned that the Court’s
holding should be applied narrowly. 297 Finally, Justices Sotomayor’s
and Kagan’s dissent argued that this decision essentially makes
asylum determinations by the executive branch unreviewable,

290

Id. at 1983.
Id.
292
Id. at 1975.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1975-82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the respondent’s
misapplication and overgeneralization of “finality era” such as Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892)).
295
Id. at 1982.
296
Id.
297
Id. at 1988-89.
291
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granting a problematic amount of unchecked power to a single
branch.298
Although this case dealt mainly with the constitutionality of
expedited removal proceedings, or lack thereof, Thuraissigiam
affected asylum law in several ways.
Most prominently,
Sotomayor’s dissent highlights a common theme throughout Supreme
Court precedent that addresses immigration law – cede power to the
executive branch.299 By upholding the constitutionality of an
expedited removal procedure without requiring the applicant to be
heard in court, the Court showed its dedication to delegate broad
decision-making authority to immigration officials and the executive
branch.300 While the IIRIRA, the statute containing the applicable
expedited removal procedures in this case, intends to protect asylum
seekers who have a credible fear of persecution, this decision chipped
away at the little procedural protections asylum seekers have to
defend themselves from arbitrary abuses of power by the federal
government.301 Since Thuraissigiam did not specifically challenge
the legality of his detention, instead choosing to challenge the legality
of the asylum officer’s decision to deny his asylum petition – which
directly caused his detention – the Court found that he was not
entitled to relief.302 This rigid approach when it applies the law to
noncitizens is extremely harmful to asylum applicants who are
already in a difficult situation when confronted by immigration and
federal officials.303 Finally, the Court reaffirmed the notion that
noncitizens, such as asylum seekers, lack many of the constitutional
and legal protections available to citizens. 304 This negatively impacts
those applying to seek refuge in this country because they are not
treated as “people” deserving full due process under the language of
the Fifth Amendment, rather they are harshly characterized as

298

Id. at 1993.
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 1963.
302
Id. at 1975.
303
Not only are the confronted aliens already in a rough situation by having to
escape a life or death situation at home, they faces notable hurdles in the United
States immigration system. Some of the struggles for immigrants involved in
asylum decisions have been discussed in earlier sections of this Note. See supra
Section III.
304
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1982.
299
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“aliens” – which has the potential for mistreatment in their
proceedings.
While Thuraissigiam was the central asylum-based decision
by the Court during the post-COVID Trump period, Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California affected
asylum indirectly by addressing the constitutionality of the DACA
and DAPA programs305 – programs that are linked to asylum. 306
Several groups of plaintiffs challenged former Secretary of Homeland
Security Elaine Duke’s June 2017 decision to rescind the DACA and
DAPA programs in June 2017.307 Each of the plaintiffs won at the
district court level, and the federal government appealed the various
district court decisions to the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. 308
Before judgment, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari.309 When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in all of
the government’s petitioned cases. 310
In its 5-4 decision in Regents, the Court upheld the DACA
program on the ground that the sudden decision to rescind the
program was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”).311 While this case dealt with immigration relief, the Court
held that the INA did not apply to the DHS’s decision to rescind the
DACA program because the parties did not challenge any removal
proceedings.312 The Court found that the DHS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in rescinding DACA;313 however, the Court majority
failed to find any animus in the Department’s policy.314 Due to this
lack of animus, the Court held the door open to potential later
challenges of DACA, as long as the challenger followed the proper
procedures under the APA. 315
2.

Executive Orders / Formal Presidential

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1905.
See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
307
Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901.
308
Id. at 1902-05.
309
Id. at 1905.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 1915.
312
Id. at 1907.
313
Id. at 1915.
314
Id. at 1916.
315
Id. at 1919.
305
306
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Statements
Even more than the first three years of the Trump
Administration, when the issue of COVID-19 reached the United
States, former President Trump became extremely forward in stating
his intentions to restrict immigration into the country as much as
possible. By hiding under the guise of national security and the
health and welfare of individuals due to the pandemic, which will be
discussed later in this Note, 316 former President Trump issued
sweeping executive orders and memorandums barring practically
every group of immigrants due to the increased health risk of
traveling in and out of the country. 317 A list of these groups includes,
but is not limited to: workers, 318 students,319 individuals from specific
countries,320 and certain visa groups.321 The broad ban placed on
general immigration procedures also indirectly affected asylum
applicants. First, the placement of these restrictions forcibly stopped
the UCSIS’s application processing system – putting a halt not only
to these specific groups but to the entire immigration process.
Considering the already lengthy asylum process, the Trump
316

See infra Section VII.
Nick Miroff, Maria Sacchetti, & Tracy Jan, Trump to Suspend Immigration to
U.S. for 60 Days Citing Coronavirus Crisis and Job Shortage, but Will Allow Some
Workers,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
21,
2020,
5:01
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/coronavirus-trump-suspendimmigration/2020/04/21/464e2440-838d-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html.
318
See Proclamation 10052, 82 Fed. Reg. 38263 (2020); Proclamation 10014, 85
Fed. Reg. 23441 (2020).
319
Jill Filipovic, Trump Administration’s Planned Purge of Students Serves a Cruel
Purpose,
CNN
(July
22,
2020,
1:18
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/opinions/ice-online-learning-collegeinternational-students-filipovic/index.html.
320
See Proclamation 10041, 85 Fed. Reg. 38263 (2020) (excluding immigrants
attempting to come into the country from countries such as Hong Kong, Macau,
Iran, the UK, Brazil, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland); see also Immigration Policy Updates,
U. OF CAL MERCED, https://iss.ucmerced.edu/immigrationpolicyupdates (last
visited Feb. 25, 2021).
321
Trump Extends Covid-Related Visa Ban; Health Coverage Policy Advances,
ASSOCED.
PRESS
(Dec.
31,
2020,
10:16
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-extends-covid-related-visaban-health-coverage-policy-advances-n1252638.
317
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Administration’s imposition of additional roadblocks only served to
further delay the process.322 Also, many people seek to obtain other
types of temporary visas to come to the United States in order to
escape their situation while they look for more permanent forms of
immigration relief.323
On December 10, 2020, in his final days of office, former
President Trump also tried to pass a “Death to Asylum” Rule; 324
however, that rule was ultimately challenged and struck down after
twenty-two attorneys general from across the country challenged
these pending regulations through amicus briefs to their local state
and federal courts.325 While this rule was ultimately struck down in
January 2021,326 the brazenness of this proposed rule shows how bold
and confident the Trump Administration was, especially former
President Trump himself and the executive branch, in their ability to
shape asylum law into whatever it wanted using whatever language it
pleased. In this 128 page document, former President Trump
attempted to create “insurmountable procedural barriers, evidentiary
burdens, and qualification standards to prevent . . . groups . . . from
being able to exercise their right to seek and enjoy asylum in the
United States.”327 With the exception of the “Death to Asylum” rule,
which was never passed, President Biden has since reversed each of

Nina Narahari, ‘The Backlog is Just Going to Get Bigger’: COVID-19 in the
Asylum
Process,
DAILY
CAL.
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.dailycal.org/2020/05/06/the-backlog-is-just-going-to-get-biggercovid-19-in-the-asylum-process.
323
See Dual Intent Visas and the Concept of Nonimmigrant Intent Explained,
CITIZENPATH (Jan. 21, 2020), https://citizenpath.com/dual-intent-visas.
324
85 Fed. Reg. 80274 (2020).
325
Nancy Kelehar, Legal Challenge to Trump’s “Death to Asylum” Regulations
Creates
Hope,
HUM.
RTS.
PULSE
(Jan.
19,
2021),
https://www.humanrightspulse.com/mastercontentblog/legal-challenge-to-trumpsdeath-to-asylum-regulations-creates-hope.
326
Sabi Ardalan, Court Blocks Illegal “Death to Asylum” Rule, HARV. IMMGR. &
REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://harvardimmigrationclinic.org/2021/01/09/breaking-court-blocks-illegaldeath-to-asylum-trump-rule.
327
Bill Frelick, The Trump Administration’s Final Insult and Injury to Refugees,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Dec.
11,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/11/trump-administrations-final-insult-andinjury-refugees.
322
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former President Trump’s policies which directly attack asylum that
are mentioned in this Note.328
VI.

WAS THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH TO
ASYLUM CONSTITUTIONAL?

During his four years in office, former President Trump did
not make it a secret that he does not approve of the asylum program
and thinks the program is an illegitimate immigration loophole.329
Even though this Note argues that former President Trump’s attempts
to effectively eliminate asylum-based immigration were certainly in
violation of essential constitutional principles, that does not
necessarily make those actions illegal, or even unconstitutional. As
previously emphasized throughout this Note, the executive branch
has received an enormous amount of immigration power through
delegation from the legislative and judicial branches.330 On one
hand, with essentially carte blanche to handle immigration however
that particular administration sees fit, the President can issue asylum
policies even if they infringe upon traditional constitutional values
such as the separation of powers or the protection of individuals’
constitutional rights. On the other hand, just because the executive
branch is allowed to act the way it has, this does not mean that the
constitutionality of its actions should not be questioned.

Migrant
Protection
Protocols,
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols (Aug. 25, 2021, 12:01 AM)
(reversal of MPP); Exec. Order 14,013, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,839 (Feb. 4, 2021) (reversal
of “Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement”); Exec.
Order 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,051 (Jan. 25, 2021) (reversal of “Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements”). While President Biden has reversed
the executive orders discussed in this Note that specifically attack asylum, some of
the COVID immigration regulations that targeted overall immigration into the US,
therefore placing burdens on asylum, have still been kept intact. See COVID-19
Travel Restrictions and Exceptions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULATE
AFFS.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-informationresources/covid-19-travel-restrictions-and-exceptions.html (Sept. 15, 2021).
329
See, e.g., Exec. Order 13,767, supra note 257; @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER
(Sept.
11,
2019,
8:23:15
PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22asylum%22;
@realDonaldTrump,
TWITTER
(July
30,
2019,
6:43:52
AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22asylum%22.
330
See supra Sections IV(C), V(A)(2), V(B)(2).
328
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Separation of Powers Issues

The framers of the Constitution created the three separate
branches of government in a checks and balances system in order to
avoid having one branch that is overly powerful and essentially
unchallengeable.331 However, the extreme amount of delegation to
the President, where Congress and the Court have essentially given
all of their immigration decision-making power to the executive
branch, is a highly problematic violation of this founding principle. 332
The branch with the highest degree of constitutional authority
to regulate all matters of immigration law is the legislature, where
according to Article 1 Section 8, Congress has the power to establish
a “uniform Rule of Naturalization” under Clause 4. 333 However
throughout the years, Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated
almost all of its authority to soundly form immigration law to the
President and the executive branch. 334 Furthermore, the Court has
endorsed this extremely broad delegation and granted a significant
amount of discretion to key players in the executive branch, such as
the President and the Attorney General. 335 An example of the
problematic nature of this uncontrolled expansion of presidential
power is how President Trump regularly used the INA to unilaterally
tear down asylum. 336 While excessive delegation is a problem that
spans across many areas of government and is not unique to only the
Trump Administration, this method used by former President Trump
is especially ironic because: (1) the INA was a work of Congress, (2)
the INA was instrumental to the creation of asylum, and (3) President
Trump intentionally used this specific act to destroy the very thing
that Congress originally had the power to establish and regulate under
the Constitution.337

331

Checks
and
Balances,
HISTORY
(Dec.
4,
2020),
https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/checks-and-balances.
332
See Live at the National Constitution Center, The President and Immigration
Law, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/podcast/the-president-and-immigration.
333
U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8 cl. 4.
334
See supra Section IV(A)(1); see also Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration, 119 YALE L. J. 458 (2009).
335
See supra Section IV(B).
336
See, e.g., Proclamation 10043, 85 Fed. Reg. 384353 (2020).
337
Id.
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One issue at the heart of the separation of powers conflict
between the legislative and executive branches is the classification of
immigration law as either domestic or foreign law.
While
immigration law definitely has its roots in both foreign and domestic
law,338 it is important to make this distinction, because the label
placed on asylum law helps to define the scope of the President’s
constitutional power. According to the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,339 the President has
unprecedented power in the realm of foreign affairs.340 Not only
have foreign affairs traditionally been an executive field of law,
passed directly from the Crown to the President, 341 but also Congress
grants more deference to the President to shape foreign law because,
as Head of State, he is the central voice of the nation. 342 While the
President has plenary powers to shape U.S. foreign policy or
international law, this power should be defined through a narrow
scope. Often times throughout modern American history, Presidents
have observed the power disparity the executive branch has in
shaping foreign versus domestic law and, therefore, have tried to
frame issues that are truly domestic in nature as international or
foreign issues.343 Despite the creative framing utilized by the
executive branch, courts should look at these cleverly disguised
issues through the lens of a domestic executive policy.344 The Court
held in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer345 that the executive
power in “foreign” issues that have largely domestic roots, such as

338

See supra Section IV.
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
340
Id. at 319-20 (“It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone
with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.”).
341
Id. at 316.
342
Id. at 316-17. The Court establishes the President’s role in this capacity by
discussing how the different states are not sovereign nations and, therefore, do not
engage in international negotiations. Id.
343
See Harlan Cleveland, The Internationalization of Domestic Affairs, 442
ANNALS AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 125 (1979).
344
Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J. L. &
POLITICS 1, 13-14, 19-21 (2000).
345
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
339
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labor disputes in the steel industry during a current war, is notably
less than the President’s actual foreign policy power. 346
Former President Trump’s framing of immigration, especially
asylum law, fits very well within the Youngstown Sheet – CurtissWright conflict. While immigration law includes many domestic
elements,347 the executive branch, especially under the Trump
Administration, has shifted the dynamic of asylum law to the debate
of “us versus them.”348 By focusing on looking outward, rather than
addressing the internal dynamics of our immigration system or
population, immigration law has taken the role of a foreign policy
issue due to national security concerns from outside countries. 349
Another issue concerning the Trump Administration’s
usurpation of immigration power by the executive branch involves a
potential breach of the nondelegation doctrine – which has made a
resurgence in the current Supreme Court. 350 Even though this was
seemingly an outdated doctrine of the Lochner Era, the arrival of
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett – two originalists – joining other
originalist Justices currently on the bench, such as Justices Thomas
and Roberts, could signal the revival of nondelegation. 351 The
346

Id. at 641-43 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Harold Fields, Immigration-A Domestic or an International Problem?, 156
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 41 (1931) (discussing the domestic
nature of immigration law and how it has the potential to be viewed as an
international issue).
348
Arash Emamzadeh, The Psychology of “Us-vs-Them,” PSYCH. TODAY (Aug. 9,
2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/finding-new-home/201908/thepsychology-us-vs-them.
349
Id.; Kimmy Yam, How Biden Can Undo the Divisions Trump Deepened in
Immigrant Communities, NBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2021, 1:20 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/how-biden-can-undo-divisionstrump-deepened-immigrant-communities-n1256228; Tara Wu, The Long History of
Blaming Immigrants in Times of Sickness, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/long-history-blamingimmigrants-times-sickness-180976053.
350
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 286-87 (2021); William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation
Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could Like, AM. CONST. SOC’Y,
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-court-review/toward-a-nondelegation-doctrine-that-even-progressives-could-like (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
351
See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Non-Delegation Doctrine
Returns After Long Hiatus, SCOTUS BLOG (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-law-students-non-delegationdoctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus; Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial
347
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principal two-part theory behind the nondelegation doctrine is that:
(1) neither Congress nor the President can change the form or
function of the Constitution 352 and (2) the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of the Constitution.353
Both Congress and the Court are disrupting the goals and
means of the nondelegation doctrine both through the passive role
they have recently taken in immigration law, as well as through their
overly broad express delegations of authority to the executive branch.
For example, by taking more of a passive role in recent asylum
law,354 Congress is allowing the President and his executive branch to
commandeer quasi-legislative functions, especially through the ease
and speed of which immigration-based executive orders are passed
and implemented. Additionally, the Court has impliedly delegated
quasi-judicial functions to the executive branch as well by allowing
the President and Attorney General to serve as judge, jury, and
executioner in expedited removal cases for denied asylum seekers. 355
Third, Congress and the Court during the Trump
Administration have bypassed the issue of a balance of powers
among the branches by expressly granting an enormous amount of
power and discretion to the executive branch to make immigration
decisions.356 The Supreme Court regularly held that members of the
executive branch, especially the President and Attorney General,
have ultimate discretion to issue final asylum decisions and that these
decisions are largely unreviewable. 357 Meanwhile, Former President
Trump sought to take advantage of § 212(f) of the INA – an express
delegation of carte blanche removal power to the President – to
institute policies such as his Muslim ban and the Remain in Mexico

Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J. L., ECON., & ORG., 27 (2018);
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 350; Araiza, supra note 350; Nondelegation’s
Unprincipled Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (2021).
352
See William N. Eskridge Jr. & Neomi Rao, Article I, Section 1: General
Principles,
CONST.
CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/interpretation/article-i/clauses/749 (last visited Apr. 6, 2021).
353
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1958).
354
Melanie Nezer, An Overview Of Pending Asylum and Refugee Legislation In
The US Congress, 2 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 121, 121 (2014).
355
See supra Sections IV(B), V(A)(1), V(B)(1).
356
See supra Section V.
357
Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive? National Security and the
Limits of Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731 (2017).
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Program.358 This broad grant of unreviewable, or at the very least
highly discretionary authority, is contrary to the intended purpose of
the founders when they created our federalist democracy – to keep
each branch of equal power so one branch does not dominate the
others.359
Finally, it is important to mention that former President
Trump also informally expanded the presence of the executive branch
past its constitutional limits. In his capacity as administrative head of
federal agencies, under his “Take Care” power,360 former President
Trump regularly implemented and encouraged policy decisions that
made it significantly harder for asylum seekers during his four-year
term. Three of these policies include the: closure of UCSIS offices
across the country,361 imposition of a monetary fee for asylum
applications,362 and increased use of ICE to rapidly increase
detentions and expedite deportations. 363 These unilaterally instituted
informal policies create a conflict between the branches similar to the
issues raised in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.364 Here,
Stuart Anderson, How to Limit a President’s Power Over Immigration, FORBES
(June
8,
2020,
12:07
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/06/08/how-to-limit-a-presidentspower-over-immigration/?sh=19fa8ac92531.
359
See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
360
U.S. CONST. art. II, §3. The Take Care power says that the President has the
power to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id. This has been
interpreted to include the power of the President to make sure government agencies
are properly implementing and administrating the laws issued by the executive
branch. Powers Derived from the “Take Care” Duty, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-3/powers-derivedfrom-the-take-care-duty (last visited Feb. 27, 2021).
361
USCIS Temporarily Closing Offices to the Public March 18 – April 1, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGR.
SERVS.
(Mar.
17,
2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-temporarily-closing-offices-to-the-publicmarch-18-april-1; USCIS Office Closings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
(Mar. 19, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/uscis-office-closings. Offices
have been closed across the country for over a year and have only begun to start
opening to full capacity. Id. Furthermore, emergency operations were closed
nationwide from March 19, 2020 to June 4, 2020. USCIS Offices Prepare to
Reopen on June 4, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-offices-preparing-to-reopen-on-june-4.
362
See infra notes 401-04 and accompanying text.
363
Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, THE ATL. (Sept. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09/trump-ice/565772.
364
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (Jackson,
J., concurring) (discussing the three categories of presidential action as it relates to
358
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there was no express delegation to former President Trump to create
the informal policies he did. With that said, former President Trump
still managed to sneak in additional policies that further increased the
executive branch’s sphere of influence regarding immigration law
while making it harder for asylum seekers to come to and stay in this
country. One of these informal policies even involved changing the
requirements for an asylum application, something that is squarely in
the jurisdiction of the legislative branch.365
Through these formal and informal actions, former President
Trump has greatly expanded the presence of the executive branch in
not only enforcing, but also shaping and interpreting immigration law
to the detriment of the other branches.
B.

Issues Involving Individuals’ Constitutional Rights

Many of the immigration policies initiated by the executive
branch violate individual rights under the Constitution. Even though
non-citizens are not granted full protection under the Constitution,
they are protected by several Constitutional rights.366 While there are
many categories of rights allocated to both non-citizens and citizens

the President’s relationship to Congress on the issue). Here, Congress’s silence as
presidents continue to seize power in immigration law would likely fall under
Category Two – the limbo land. Id. at 637. In this category, it is important to
justify the President’s actions only by analyzing his Article II powers. Id. This is
because the President neither acted with the express authority of Congress (which
would give the President authority under Article I to do what he is doing as well)
nor did he act specifically against what Congress said (which would severely
weaken the President’s power under Article II by subtracting whatever
Congressional powers under Article I are in direct conflict with the President’s
actions). Id. at 637-39.
365
BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46142, THE POWER OF CONGRESS
AND THE EXECUTIVE TO EXCLUDE ALIENS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES (2019).
366
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (upholding the right of illegal
aliens to receive a public education); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)
(upholding the integrity of the family unit as a fundamental right of all people, not
just citizens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (upholding due process
rights for all people, not just citizens). But see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
N.R.L.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that undocumented immigrants are not
entitled to the same employment protections as citizens are); Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (holding that paperwork for a Notice to Appear in
immigration court need not adhere to the same standards of notice required by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to citizens).
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alike,367 this section of the Note will focus primarily on violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, because those are the most applicable to the Trump
Administration’s asylum policies.
The relevant language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that “any State [shall not] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”368 By
distinguishing this part of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies
to “any person,” from the rest of section 1, which applies only to
citizens of the United States, the plain language of the Constitution
guarantees due process and equal protection rights to everyone,
including undocumented immigrants and asylees.369
There were several times in the Trump Administration’s
“Zero Tolerance” policy that former President Trump tried to restrict
asylum applicants’ constitutional rights as much as possible.
Specifically, there were three notable demonstrations of the Trump
administration’s assault on asylum which were challenged on
constitutional grounds – the ruling in Trump v. Hawaii, the ruling in
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, and the Remain
in Mexico Program.
The constitutionality of former President Trump’s actions was
on full display in Trump v. Hawaii due to the discrimination of the
Muslim ban and its apparent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. Normally, policies that discriminate on the
basis of national origin or alienage 370 receive strict scrutiny –
367

See Ilya Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARNLIBERTY (Apr.
30,
2017),
https://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-ofnoncitizens; Gretchen Frazee, What Constitutional Rights Do Undocumented
Immigrants
Have?,
PBS
(June
25,
2018),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-constitutional-rights-doundocumented-immigrants-have (discussing the scope of non-citizens’ rights to due
process, legal counsel, family integrity, vote or hold office in local elections,
education, and protection from unreasonable searches and seizures).
368
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
369
Rachel Stockman, Yes, ‘Illegal Immigrants’ Do Have Constitutional Rights
Even Under Trump’s New Immigration Plan, L. & CRIME (Feb. 22, 2017, 8:36
AM), https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/yes-illegal-immigrants-do-have-rightsunder-trumps-new-immigration-plan.
370
The distinction between national origin and alienage is often hard to make;
however, the Court has tended to look at national origin from the perspective of
United States citizens and alienage from the perspective of non-citizens. Alienage
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meaning “the law must advance a compelling state interest by the
least restrictive means available.” 371 However, there are exceptions
to the strict scrutiny analysis, including discriminatory actions taken
by the federal government to protect national security.372
While the Court used this exception to hold that the Muslim
ban was constitutional, even though it was facially discriminatory on
the basis of alienage, the Court recognized the similarity between this
case and Korematsu v. United States, tried to distinguish the two
cases as much as possible, and failed.373 Both Trump v. Hawaii and
Korematsu deal with facially discriminatory policies by the federal
government on the basis of alienage and national origin. 374 Also,
both cases justify their holdings by referencing the President’s power
to protect national security. In its failure to learn from history, the
Court in Trump v. Hawaii issued a troublesome ruling that granted
carte blanche to the federal government as long as it comes up with a
good excuse for its deprivations of peoples’ fundamental
constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, the Court’s ruling in Thuraissigiam and Former
President Trump’s Remain in Mexico Policy both demonstrate clear
examples of the Trump Administration’s violation of asylum seekers’
constitutional right to due process – especially their rights to petition
for habeas corpus and to have their day to be heard in court. 375
VII.

WAS COVID-19 THE PERFECT SCAPEGOAT TO USE?

In the wake of one of the most severe pandemics in recent
memory, almost every country across the world shut down to some

and Nationality, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitutionconan/amendment-14/section-1/alienage-and-nationality (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
371
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
372
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (using the language of the
rational basis test to apply to issues involving discrimination based on alienage
such as “facially legitimate for a bona fide reason”).
373
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
374
Id. at 2447-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). One should realize that there were other
concerns, outside of discrimination regarding immigration, in both cases –
especially Trump v. Hawaii – including religion as well as due process and equal
protection for U.S. citizens; however, for the purposes of this Note, the discussion
of both cases focuses on issues of discrimination on the basis of alienage.
375
See supra Sections V(A)(2), (B)(1).
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degree.376 The reason for these policies was two-fold – (1) stop, or at
least slow down, the spread of the disease in their country and (2)
protect domestic economies as much as possible that were affected by
mandatory global shutdowns. 377
However, former President Trump saw another opportunity
brought by the pandemic shutdowns.378 For the first three years of
his administration, he demonstrated his strict dedication to his Zero
Tolerance immigration policy and to eliminating any forms of
migratory relief that do not adhere to that policy, such as asylum. 379
As other countries restricted immigration-based entry, the Trump
Administration rapidly issued many executive orders and policies to
negatively impact asylees and refugees. 380 Not only did former
President Trump follow suit with other leaders by restricting the
number of immigrants allowed into the country, he instituted
universal travel bans – both related to country of origin and type of
immigration.381 One of the travel bans specifically targeted asylum
and ordered the complete stop to the processing of asylum applicants
trying to enter through the southern border. 382 At the same time,
former President Trump thrived on the culture of fear surrounding the
COVID-19 pandemic and escalated the number of detentions and
expedited deportations during his final nine months in office. 383
Finally, for individuals who were currently processing asylum claims,
former President Trump issued a massive shutdown of the entire
immigration court system384 – the effects of which are still being felt

Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/coronavirus (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
377
Jack Herrera & Quito Tsui, Could Covid-19 Mean the End of Asylum Law in the
United
States?,
THE
NATION
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/coronavirus-refugee-asylum-law.
378
Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S.
Immigration System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/usimmigration-system-changes-trump-presidency.
379
See supra Section V(A).
380
See supra note 320.
381
See supra notes 320-21; see also Pierce & Bolter, supra note 378.
382
Pierce & Boulter, supra note 378.
383
Id.
384
Id.
376
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over a year later, as there are still no in-person immigration
proceedings in several major locations as of June 17, 2021.385
While the Trump Administration was not subtle in its
immigration objectives throughout the entire term, Former President
Trump was granted more leeway to control immigration under the
general label of “public health and safety.” 386 By masking these
clearly discriminatory policies targeting individual groups of
immigrants under the guise of protecting American health, former
President Trump pushed most of his asylum initiatives forward
without pushback from Congress, the Court, or a significant portion
of the American public. 387
VIII. DIRE NEED FOR SERIOUS IMMIGRATION REFORM
“Comprehensive immigration reform” is a term that frequents
campaign platforms during election years, because many Americans
agree that the immigration system is “badly broken and in urgent
need of reform.”388 However, while there is a consensus that
immigration reform is necessary, the complex and highly politicized
nature of immigration law makes it hard for Americans to come

385

Conversation with Judge Alice Segal from the New York Immigration Court on
Sep. 22, 2020 at 5:30 PM EST; Operational Status Map, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir-operational-status/operational-status-map (last visited
June 17, 2021). While many locations are now open as of June 17, 2021, there are
some locations that are still fully closed as of the date of visiting the website such
as Houston – Greenspoint Park and Louisville. Id. There are also locations that are
only open for limited purposes. For example, these locations are open for filings
only (not for any hearings): Houston – South Gessner Road, Memphis, New York –
Broadway, and Otay Mesa (San Diego). Id. There are also locations that are
currently only allowing detained hearings (with most of these locations resuming
non-detained hearings on July 6, 2021) including: Dallas, El Paso, Fort Snelling
(Minnesota), Guaynabo (San Juan), Harlingen (Texas), Houston, Kansas City, New
York – Federal Plaza, New York – Varick, and Portland. Id.
386
How the Trump Administration is Using COVID-19 to End Asylum, INT’L
RESCUE COMM. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.rescue.org/article/how-trumpadministration-using-covid-19-end-asylum.
387
Id.
388
Focusing on the Solutions: Key Principles of Comprehensive Immigration
Reform,
IMMIGR.
POL’Y
CTR.
(Mar.
2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Solutions
_Paper_032310.pdf.
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together on a universal policy to help improve the system.389 This
section will focus on four goals of immigration reform that have an
impact on asylum law.390
A.

Goals of Immigration Reform
1.

Create a direct, fair, and inclusive path to
citizenship

The overarching goal is to provide a “direct, fair, and
inclusive path to citizenship for immigrants in the U.S. without
papers.” Within this objective, there are three smaller tasks. First,
the government needs to make the process more transparent and less
complicated for immigrants to follow by providing a straightforward
set of rules and easily applicable procedures. Second, it is important
that the federal government establishes flexible alternative channels
for immigration other than the formalized system already in place.
Finally, it is important for the government to remove some of the
additional barriers imposed on asylum that other countries do not
have, such as the asylum application processing fee of fifty dollars.391
Furthermore, the entire asylum process is extremely technical
and complicated. As demonstrated earlier in this Note, even the
Justices of the highest court in the country have struggled to provide
clear definitions for qualifications under asylum law.392 Also, the
process is not accommodating to asylees whatsoever because it is
incredibly intimidating for applicants.
Currently, the asylum
procedure follows a rigid process that does not leave much room for
applicants to explain their individual circumstances. 393 Other than an
initial confrontation with a border patrol officer, the only times
asylum applicants can share their story before being thrust into court
389

James F Hollifield, What Makes Immigration Reform So Hard, GEORGE W.
BUSH
INST.
(Winter
2018),
https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/immigration/hollifield-immigrationreform.html.
390
There are other areas in immigration law that are referenced when notions of
immigration reform are brought up – especially labor law, family-based
immigration, and temporary visas. However, this Note will mainly focus on goals
that have a direct or indirect impact on asylum law.
391
85 Fed. Reg. 87,251 (Dec. 18, 2020).
392
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
393
See supra Section III.
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proceedings are in the I-589 Application and one sixty-minute
interview with an ICE or USCIS official. 394 However, this is
insufficient to determine what the applicant has endured.
Moreover, a study in 2017 found that 72% of refugees at
arrival, and 58% after five years, are below basic in English
literacy.395 Another 18% of refugees at arrival and 25% of refugees
are only at a basic level of English proficiency after five years in the
United States.396 Only 6% of refugees at arrival, and 18% after five
years, are actually proficient in the English language. 397 Thus, if
applicants are forced to explain their entire life stories in a form that
requires a specially trained immigration attorney to complete, even
for native English speakers, they are placed at a significant
disadvantage. Then, after that, they wait for months, if not years,
after they filed their original application to talk to an immigration
representative for only a single hour. 398 Both the form and the
interview pose themselves as very scary situations for the applicant
and create an inherent lack of fairness in a process where people feel
they are intimidated by the federal government the entire time. Also,
when an undocumented immigrant is discovered in the U.S. – even
one who is currently applying for asylum – there are very few options
available to them to obtain legal status. 399 Their only options are to
succeed in their asylum claim, which is very difficult to do, or try to
obtain residency before they are detained and deported, an even more
difficult task if their asylum claim is denied.400
Finally, additional barriers to obtain asylum that are not in the
original system, but are now imposed by the federal government, do
not make the process any easier. One of the additional barriers
imposed by the Trump Administration on asylum applicants is the
new fifty dollar processing fee for asylum applications.401 Only four
394

See supra Section III.
Jason Richwine, Rough Estimates of Refugee Literacy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD.
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://cis.org/Richwine/Rough-Estimates-Refugee-Literacy.
396
Id.
397
Id.
398
See supra Section III.
399
David J. Bier, Reforming the Immigration System: A Brief Outline, CATO INST.
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.cato.org/study/reforming-immigration-system-briefoutline.
400
See id. (discussing the inflexibility of the immigration system and the problem
of the all-or-nothing approach when it comes to undocumented immigrants).
401
85 Fed. Reg. 87,251 (Dec. 18, 2020).
395
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countries in the world, including the United States, currently charge
asylum applicants a fee. 402 Even though fifty dollars does not seem
like much of a burden to an average American, this fee is sometimes
an insurmountable problem for asylum seekers who are already
fleeing from dangerous situations in their home countries and often
have no money when entering the country. 403 Furthermore, the little
money asylum seekers may have does not go very far in the United
States due to the conversion rate of their domestic currencies. 404
2.

Decrease ICE’s role in exchange for
increasing the EOIR’s presence

The second goal is to reform the enforcement of immigration
laws. This involves both the necessary change to ICE’s policies as
well as the creation of an independent immigration court system that
is not attached to the executive branch. Similar to the rationale
behind defunding the police in an aim at reformation,405 requests are
regularly made across the country to defund ICE and to engage in
more targeted, less cruel immigration enforcement.406 Paired with
402

Jessica Sutherland, Only Three Nations in the World Charge Asylum Seekers a
Fee. Trump Wants the U.S. to be the Fourth, DAILY KOS (Nov. 9, 2019, 2:40 PM),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2019/11/9/1898288/-Only-three-nations-in-theworld-charge-asylum-seekers-a-fee-Trump-wants-the-U-S-to-be-the-fourth.
The
other three countries are Fiji, Australia, and Iran. Id.
403
See Ryan Baugh, Annual Flow Report – Refugees and Asylees: 2020, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2019/refugee_and_asylee_2019.pdf (giving the top ten home
countries of asylum applicants and each country has a lower exchange rate when
compared to the United States dollar).
404
See id.
405
Michael Schwirtz & Ali Watkins, Why the $6 Billion N.Y.P.D. is Now a Target
of
‘Defund
the
Police,’
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/nyregion/nypd-budget-defund-police.html.
406
See
Defund
Hate,
NAT’L
IMMIGR.
JUST.
CTR.,
https://immigrantjustice.org/issues/defundhate (last visited Mar. 28, 2021); Beth
Hallowell, How to Talk About Defunding ICE and CBP—and Investing in
Communities,
AM.
FRIENDS
SERV.
COMM.
(July
14,
2020),
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/how-to-talk-about-defundingice-and-cbp-and-investing-communities; Julian Resendiz, Activists Want Biden to
Defund ICE, Overhaul Migrant Detention Policies, BORDER REP. (Jan. 22, 2021,
3:32 PM), https://www.borderreport.com/hot-topics/immigration/activists-wantbiden-to-defund-ice-overhaul-migrant-detention-policies; Kari Hong, 10 Reasons
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this initiative to reduce the role of ICE in immigration enforcement is
to allow immigration courts to stand on their own feet. Right now,
immigration courts are directly under the Department of Justice and
function almost as administrative courts out of the Executive Office
of Immigration Review (“EOIR”). 407 Furthermore, the executive
branch maintains additional control over the immigration courts
because adjudications by the EOIR are squarely “under delegated
authority from the Attorney General.”408 By creating an independent
immigration court system that looks more like the judiciary rather
than an adjudicative forum of an executive agency, there will no
longer be an inherent conflict of interest between the court and the
Attorney General.409 Furthermore, this will help to correct the severe
imbalance of powers between the executive and judicial branches in
the field of immigration law by removing some adjudicative control
from the executive branch.410
3.

Change focus in creating available facilities
to immigrants

Third, there should be an overhaul of the facilities available to
immigrants to treat them more humanely as they undergo the asylum
process. This involves: the removal of ICE detention centers, the
promotion of sanctuary cities, and the reinstatement of the USCIS
offices that were closed during the Trump Administration in response
to the pandemic.
First, ICE detention centers are inhumane facilities.411 There
are not only problems of overcrowding at detention centers,412 but
Why Congress Should Defund ICE’s Deportation Force, 43 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. &
SOC. CHANGE 40 (2019).
407
Executive Office for Immigration Review – About The Office, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office.
408
Id.
409
Katie Shepherd, Calls for Independent Immigration Court Grow Louder at
Congressional
Hearing,
IMMIGR.
IMPACT
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://immigrationimpact.com/2020/01/30/independent-immigration-courthearing/#.YGKCOS1h1-U.
410
Id.
411
New Report Shines Spotlight on Abuses and Growth in Immigrant Detention
Under Trump, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 30, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/30/us-new-report-shines-spotlight-abuses-andgrowth-immigrant-detention-under-trump; David J. Bier, Are CBP’s Filthy and
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ICE detainees also have a severe lack of access to: showers, space to
sit or lay down, toilets, sanitary products, air conditioning or heat,
sleeping materials, water, food, and adequate medical care. 413 Due to
unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, and inadequate medical care,
ICE detention facilities have a significantly higher risk of COVID-19
outbreaks – even with the underreported numbers given by ICE
officials.414 Finally, ICE detention centers are extremely costly to
maintain; therefore, eliminating these facilities provides a financial
benefit as well as a humanitarian one. 415
Second, sanctuary cities are vital to provide refuge to asylum
seekers who are looking to immediately flee dangerous situations in
their home countries.416 Not only are these areas safer environments
for immigrants than their home countries, these cities are remarkably
low in crime across the board – despite what members of the Trump
Administration said to sway the public opinion against these areas.417
Finally, by reopening USCIS offices and resuming their full
functionality, it will immeasurably help asylum applicants in two
main ways. Reopening these offices to full capacity would alleviate
the backlog of immigration cases in the system and asylum claims
could be processed at a faster rate. Also, the provision of more
offices will make the asylum application process much easier for
asylum seekers because they will not have to travel as far to be
interviewed.
Inhumane Immigrant Detention Camps Necessary?, CATO INST. (July 3, 2019,
3:01
PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/are-cbps-filthy-inhumane-immigrantdetention-camps-necessary.
412
Bier, supra note 411. Detention centers have at times held between four to five
times the amount of people they are designed to hold. Id.
413
Id.
414
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Dashboard of ICE Data, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.vera.org/tracking-covid-19-in-immigration-detention; Letter by Parsa
Erfani et. al., COVID-19 Testing and Cases in Immigration Detention Centers,
April-August
2020
(Oct.
29,
2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2772627.
415
Vaishnavi Vaidyanathan, How Much It Costs ICE to House Immigrants in
Detention Centers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018, 1:24 AM),
https://www.ibtimes.com/how-much-it-costs-ice-house-immigrants-detentioncenters-2731743.
416
See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
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Natalie Delgadillo, The Surprising Cost of Sanctuary for Progressive Cities,
GOVERNING (May 9, 2018), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-sanctuarycities-trump-libby-schaaf.html.
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Guarantee of legal representation – carrying
Gideon to non-citizens

Finally, in order to ensure fairness in the immigration process,
immigrants and undocumented individuals applying for legal
immigration status, should be guaranteed the right to an attorney as a
constitutional right in all proceedings. Asylum applicants are
allowed to have an attorney present with them in their USCIS
interviews.418 However, the right to an attorney is not guaranteed in
all immigration proceedings. 419 Most notably, immigrants are not
entitled to an attorney once their case reaches the immigration
court.420 However, facing similar, if not greater, consequences to
personal liberty as a criminal proceeding, 421 individuals applying for
legal immigration status or currently in court for formal immigration
proceedings should be able to obtain competent legal representation
by right.422
B.

What President Biden Has Already Done in
Furtherance of These Goals

One of President Biden’s main campaign issues was centered
around fixing the destruction the Trump Administration caused to
immigration – stating that “Trump has waged an unrelenting assault
on our values and our history as a nation of immigrants. It’s wrong,
and it stops when Joe Biden is elected president.” 423 On the
campaign trail, President Biden vowed not only to revive old Obama
immigration policies, such as DACA, he also specifically stated he

418

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
420
See Manuel, supra note 61.
421
These severe consequences include not only the deprivation of liberty through
detention, similar to a criminal case, but also detention in less humane conditions
than a prison and the risk of deportation.
422
See John Oliver, Immigration Courts: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO),
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
2,
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fB0GBwJ2QA (highlighting the lack of
adequate legal representation in court proceedings as a central issue in immigration
courts).
423
Joe Biden & Kamala Harris, The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a
Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/immigration (last
visited Mar. 27, 2020).
419
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would revive programs that former President Trump tried to tear
down – including asylum.424
During his time in office so far, President Biden has not
disappointed on that promise. First, President Biden issued several
executive orders directly targeting and seeking to overturn Former
President Trump’s actions to limit asylum. 425 Some of the initiatives
of these reforms to the prior administration’s immigration policy
include: a top-down review of executive agencies in charge of
administering immigration law,426 ordering the specific revival of the
asylum system and review of problematic Trump policies such as
MPP,427 and increasing the presence of humanitarian aid programs
for immigrant populations in need. 428 President Biden also sought to
change the narrative on asylum by removing the punitive stigma
attached to asylum applicants.429 Third, President Biden issued a
review of other problematic pre-Trump asylum policies including
expedited removal and safe third country agreements.430 Finally,
President Biden is working to clarify the requirements to qualify for
asylum and remove some of the artificial barriers that Former
President Trump created on his way out of office. 431 While there are
still some lingering effects of Trump’s asylum policies – such as the
continued closure of the southern border due to a health order 432 –
President Biden has already made improvements to correct the issues
of former President Trump’s asylum policy.

424
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(Feb. 2, 2021).
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CONCLUSION
As former President Clinton once said,
America has constantly drawn strength . . . from
wave[s] . . . of immigrants. In each generation, they
have proved to be the most restless, the most
adventurous, the most innovative, the most industrious
of people[;] . . . they have strengthened our economy,
enriched our culture, renewed our promise of freedom
and opportunity for all.433

On the other hand, then Senator John F. Kennedy wrote about the
greatness of America as “[a] [n]ation of [i]mmigrants”434 and warned
readers of his book about the dangers of devaluing the immigrant
population in America through protectionist rhetoric by saying,
“[h]owever, under the guise of warning people about the impact of
illegal immigration, these anti-immigrant groups often invoke the
same dehumanizing racist stereotypes as hate groups.”435
These two quotes paired together show why well-intentioned
immigration reform needs to remain a constant throughout each and
every administration, not just ebb and flow between presidential
policies. However, unless there is significant change in the interplay
between the federal branches of government in the field of
immigration law, much of the fate of those truly in need is in the
hands of a single individual and the wishes of his or her
administration. While this systemic change would be optimal to
provide stable and transparent policies in a highly complicated area
of the law, there are no signs of Congress or the Court attempting to
regain their immigration policy power from an overzealous executive
branch any time soon. Thus, moving forward, one can only hope that
President Biden continues to make positive progress in the field of
asylum law and that future presidents can keep the door open that
former President Trump tried to deadbolt permanently shut through
the unjust, yet still constitutional, use of the executive power.
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